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ABSTRACT 
 
THE EFFECT OF XBRL AND SOCIAL MEDIA ON INFORMATION ASYMMETRY: 
EVIDENCE FROM BANK LOAN CONTRACTS 
 
Dazhi Chong 
Old Dominion University, 2016 
Director: Dr. Harris Wu 
This study analyzes how two information technology advancements, the adoption of 
XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language), and social media, affect bank loan 
contracting using a sample of 554 US bank loan contracts in 2011. I hypothesize that the 
adoption of XBRL and social media can enhance information dissemination and mitigate the 
information asymmetry problem between borrowers and lenders. Consistent with this 
hypothesize, I find that borrowers that adopt XBRL and/or receive positive social media user 
opinion in social media enjoy more favorable price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. 
Additional analyses indicate that the relations among XBRL adoption, social media user opinion 
and bank loan price vary with the firm size, loan structure and availability of public information 
of borrowers. Overall, this research provides evidence that technology advancements, the 
adoption of XRBL and social media, reduce cost of bank loans by decreasing information 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1  BACKGROUND 
Recent development in information technology, especially XBRL (eXtensible Business 
Reporting Language) and social media, has changed the way that firms communicate with 
stakeholders. As a standard for exchanging business information, XBRL enables the tagging of 
information using predefined taxonomy. This feature makes it easier for analysts, investors, and 
other stakeholders to access, analyze, and process financial information. Realizing the advantage 
of XBRL, on January 30, 2009, SEC (Securities Exchange Commission) adopted rules that 
require companies to submit their financial statements in XBRL format. After June 15, 2011, the 
proposed rules apply to domestic and foreign companies using U.S. GAAP and to foreign private 
issuers using International Financial Reporting(Securities Exchange Commission, 2009). 
Another new technology, social media, also shows its potential to facilitate information 
dissemination. Social media allows firms to push information to investors or customers 
simultaneously via postings, direct message et.al. This characteristic reduces the time and cost 
that investors or customers spend in sorting through various news sources(Blankespoor, Miller, 
& White, 2013).  More importantly, social media communications are bi-directional which 
enable direct and immediate interactions among users(He, Zha, & Li, 2013). While some 
researchers have found that XBRL and social media can bypass the shortcomings of traditional 
information dissemination tools and reduce information inequities in the capital markets (Bollen, 
Mao, & Zeng, 2011; Farewell, 2006; Maina, 2015), few studies have been conducted on the 
relationship between these new technologies and loan contracts. This dissertation extends the 
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literature by examining how the adoption of XBRL, and social media sentiment, affect bank loan 
contracts. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The importance of bank loans attracts lots of researchers to investigate the determinants 
of bank loan contracting(Bae & Goyal, 2009; Benmelech, Garmaise, & Moskowitz, 2004; 
Bharath, Sunder, & Sunder, 2008; Dennis, Nandy, & Sharpe, 2000; Diamond, 1991b; Hasan, 
Park, & Wu, 2012; Haselmann, Pistor, & Vig, 2010; Klock, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2005; Lin, Chen, 
& Yen, 2014; Qian & Strahan, 2007; Strahan, 1999; Sufi, 2007; Wu, Francis, Hasan, & Koetter, 
2011). Some firm characteristics and loan characteristics such as default risk, liquidation value, 
and corporate board structure are found to be associated with loan contracts. However, there is a 
lack of current research on how the adoption of XBRL affects bank loan contracts. As XBRL has 
the potential to reduce information asymmetry in the capital markets, there is a possible link 
between XBRL adoption and loan contracts. Therefore, the first purpose of this study is to 
investigate the effect of XBRL on information asymmetry in capital markets, in particular, to 
evaluate the impact of XBRL adoption on the price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. 
Hence, the first two research questions that need to be answered are: 
             1. Can the adoption of XBRL affect price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts? 
             2. How does the adoption of XBRL affect price and non-price terms of bank loan 
contracts? 
Many studies have found that social media sentiment is an important indicator of firm's 
potential risks and values. For instance, Hu, Liu, and Zhang (2008) find that online product 
reviews are major information source for consumers to make buying decision. There is a positive 
relationship between favorable peer reviews and product sales. By analyzing the peer opinions 
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on social media, Chen, De, Hu, and Hwang (2014) find that social media sentiment has 
predictive power over future stock returns and earnings surprises. Although prior studies suggest 
that social media sentiment is associated with firm's stock returns and sales, there is a lack of 
empirical evidence of the relationship between social media sentiment and loan contracts. 
Therefore, the second purpose of this study is to investigate how social media sentiment affects 
loan contracts. This objective leads to the other two research questions of this study: 
1. Can social media sentiment affect price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts? 
2. How does social media sentiment affect price and non-price terms of bank loan 
contracts? 
1.3 THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation contributes to the literature in the following aspects. First, this 
dissertation is the first to examine the impact of XBRL adoption and social media sentiment on 
the cost of bank loan. Using a sample of 554 US bank loan contracts in 2011, this study finds 
that borrowers that adopt XBRL and/or receive positive social media user opinion enjoy more 
favorable price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. Second, this dissertation reveals that 
the effect of XBRL adoption and social media sentiment on bank loan price is not homogenous. 
The analyses show that these effects are stronger for small borrowers and syndicated loans. 
Furthermore, the analyses also find that borrowers that adopt XBRL are more likely to be offered 
with unsecured loan. 
In sum, this study confirms the hypotheses that both the adoption of XBRL and social 
media sentiment are important indicators of borrower's risks and values. The study not only 
answers the question "Can XBRL and social media affect price and non-price terms of bank 
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loan?", but also provides stakeholders with a better guide for how to use XBRL and social media 
to decrease information asymmetry in the capital markets. 
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows: chapter 2 provides a brief 
review of the literature concerned with the determinants of bank loan contracts and develops the 
hypotheses of this study. This chapter contains four sections: Section 2.1 introduces prior 
findings related to the determinants of bank loan contracts. Section 2.2 discusses the framework 
and benefits of XBRL. Section 2.3 introduces the framework and benefits of social media. The 
final section, section 2.4 discusses knowledge gap in the literature and develops the hypotheses 
of this study.   
The purpose of chapter 3 is to present the research methodology and the research 
approaches adopted by this study. This chapter contains five sections. First, section 3.1 describes 
the architecture of the Bank Loan Pricing Analytics System (BLPAS). Three key modules of 
BLPAS: data collection module, data integration module and data analysis module are 
introduced in this section. The second section, section 3.2 presents the data sources of this study. 
After introducing sampling procedure in section 3.3, section 3.4 describes the measurement of 
dependent variables, independent variables, and control variables in this study. Finally, the 
empirical models for the study are discussed in section 3.5. 
By presenting results of the regression analyses, chapter 4 provides evidences to indicate 
how XBRL and social media sentiment affect bank loan price. This chapter contains five 
sections: Section 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of dependent and 
independent variables. Section 4.2 and 4.3 presents the results of the regression analysis related 
to XBRL, social media sentiment and loan price. After discussing the results of robust test in 
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section 4.4, section 4.5 introduces the results of analysis on firm size. Section 4.6 analyzes the 
results of analysis on lending relationship. Section 4.7 reports the results of analysis on 
syndication. Finally, the results of analysis on Non-Price terms are discussed in section4.8. 
The last chapter, chapter 5 presents the research conclusion of this research. This chapter 
contains three sections. Section 5.1 discusses implications for the research. Section 5.3 
introduces future research opportunities. And section 5.4 includes a summary with conclusions. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 DETERMINANTS OF BANK LOAN PRICING  
In the bank loan literature, the determinants of bank loan contracting have attracted 
tremendous research interests. For instance, Zhang (2008) examines the benefits of accounting 
conservatism in the loan contracting process. He finds that accounting conservatism results in 
reduced default risk, which enables lenders to offer lower initial interest rates to borrowers. 
Bharath et al. (2008) focus on the relationship between borrower accounting quality and loan 
prices. They suggest that lenders have to raise interest rates and tighten non-price debt terms to 
compensate for the default risk arising from low accounting quality. Hasan et al. (2012) examine 
the impact of earnings predictability on both price and non-price terms. They find that lower 
predictable earnings are associated with higher interest rates, shorter maturities, and more 
covenants and collateral requirements. Benmelech et al. (2004) argue that higher liquidation 
value can not only lower the cost of liquidation but also increase the asset’s durability and make 
longer maturity debt feasible. Thus, borrowers with high liquidation value are more likely to 
receive favorite loans prices and no-price terms. Sufi (2007) finds that high borrower reputation 
is associated with low default risk, which enables banks to offer favorite loan terms to borrowers. 
Some studies find that corporate board structure also affects bank loan price. As an important 
corporate governance mechanisms to control loan risk, independent board makes firms easier to 
control CEO overcompensation(Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999) , limit over-
investments(Richardson, 2006) and reduce earnings management and financial fraud(Agrawal & 
Chadha, 2005; Klein, 2002). From this point, the less independent a borrower's board is, the 
more likely it will experience financial distress and be offered high loan price(Daily & Dalton, 
1994; Lee & Yeh, 2004). 
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In addition to firm characteristics, some external factors are also associated with debt 
contracting. Qian and Strahan (2007) study the impact factor of bank loan price from law and 
finance view. They argue that loan contracts are the reflection of differences in legal protection 
of lenders and the enforcement of contracts. When lenders' rights are well protected, the law 
enforces lenders' ability to the take collateral in the case of default. In this situation, borrowers 
are more likely to get favorable loan terms. Consistent with Qian's findings, Bae and Goyal 
(2009) find that firms in a region with strong creditor rights and high enforceability of loan 
contracts are more likely to receive lower loan spreads, longer maturities.  
Besides the impact factors mentioned above, theoretical work suggests that information 
asymmetry is another key determinant of loan contracting. Information asymmetry is a situation 
where at least one party in a contract relationship has more information than others. The 
occurrence of asymmetric information creates an unbalanced transaction and result in  "moral 
hazard" and "adverse selection" problems in the loan contracting(Kim, 1985). When the levels of 
information asymmetry are different, loan terms offered by lenders will also be different 
(Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Easley & O'hara, 2004). According 
to the literature, information asymmetry is mainly caused by specific firm characteristics and 
loan characteristics. For instance, Barclay and Smith (1995) examine the relationship between 
firm size and information asymmetry. Their findings suggest that large firms are more efficient 
in reducing information asymmetries. As a result, large firms are more likely to get long-term 
debt. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) argue that the agency risk and information risk between 
management and outside stakeholders will affect bank loan price. In general, these research 
imply that when information asymmetry is high between borrowers and banks, banks are more 
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likely to raise interest rates and tighten non-price debt terms to compensate for default risk and 
potential losses(Wu et al., 2011).  
In order to reduce the information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors or 
stakeholders, firms often use disclosure to disseminate private information to the markets. As a 
popular tool, disclosure has been shown to influence a number of operations related factors such 
as firm’s cost of capital (Botosan1997), analyst following (Lang and Lundholm 1996), 
institutional investor following (Bushee and Noe 2000), and stock price volume and volatility 
(Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999; Bushee and Noe 2000). The main drawbacks of disclosure are 
that it can only reach limited set of stakeholders and are often biased(Blankespoor et al., 2013; 
Miller & Skinner, 2015). For instance, business press is an important disclosure approach. Many 
investors rely on business press to acquire value relevant information. Bushee, Core, Guay, and 
Hamm (2010) find that greater press coverage around earnings announcements reduces 
information asymmetry in the form of spread reductions and depth improvements. Soltes (2010) 
finds that disclosure dissemination through the press reduces spreads, increases trading volume, 
and lowers idiosyncratic volatility. Kothari, Li, and Short (2009) find that positive (negative) 
press coverage decreases (increases) firms’ cost of capital, return volatility, and analyst forecast 
dispersion. However, some studies find that only important corporate news releases are 
sufficiently monitored by traders, increased distribution of the information by the press only 
results in little increase in dissemination(Bushee et al., 2010). Further, much of the information 
disseminated to the market by the press doesn't contain editorial content, and only provides 
limited information (Soltes, 2010).  
Beside business press, another main disclosure approach, conference call also has some 
shortcomings. Mayew (2008) argues that managers are more likely to call on analysts who have 
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more favorable recommendations. Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller (2003) find that firms with 
relatively more shareholders and relatively fewer institutional holders are more likely to open 
their conference calls. Their finding suggests that the scope of information dissemination is 
determined by the nature of the firm’s investor base.  
2.2 EXTENSIBLE BUSINESS REPORTING LANGUAGE (XBRL)  
While the shortcomings of traditional disclosure approaches often limit the depth and 
breadth of information dissemination, recent changes in technology make it possible for 
investors, analysts, and banks to bypass the weaknesses of traditional tools. Among these 
technologies, XBRL is one of the most popular tools used in today's capital markets.  
2.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
XBRL(eXtensible Business Reporting Language) is a XML based reporting language for 
exchanging business information(Zhu & Wu, 2014).  XBRL enables the tagging of information 
using predefined taxonomy. Therefore, XBRL tags can be easily accessed and interpreted by 
computer applications. Currently, XBRL has been widely used by banking regulators, stock 
exchanges regulators, investors, analysts, and statistical agencies.  
  XBRL is composed of three key components: specification, taxonomy, and instance 
documents. As a guideline of taxonomies and instance documents design, specification defines 
how to build XBRL instance documents and XBRL taxonomies. The standardization of  syntax 
of instance documents, syntax of taxonomies, semantics of instance documents, and semantics of 
taxonomies enable different users to create, exchange financial data among various 
organizations(Wu & Vasarhelyi, 2004). Table 1 shows an example of XBRL specification. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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The second component, taxonomy, contains the definitions of reporting data elements, 
reference to the shared meaning of elements, and business rules for validation and interrelation 
between data elements. The aim of taxonomy is to classify and standardize the accounting 
information generated by different types of accounting standards. Similar to the data dictionary, 
data elements and their interrelationships are well defined in taxonomy. As an extensible 
framework, XBRL taxonomy allows users to add data elements, redefine relationships and 
references. This feature enables companies to create, publish and transfer financial information 
without losing the integrity of the data(Aad & Paul, 2008). In XBRL, taxonomy is comprised of 
two major components:  XML Schemas and linkbases. Taxonomy schemas define the names and 
types of concepts. Table 2 shows the examples of taxonomy schemas of US GAAP 2016.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 Another component, linkbases, defines the relationships between data elements and 
resources related to them. The XBRL 2.1 specification defines five types of linkbases: Definition 
Linkbase, Calculation Linkbase, Presentation Linkbase, Reference Linkbase and Label Linkbase. 
The first three linkbases describe inter-concept relationships, and the last two linkbases define 
the relationships between concept and documentation(Engel et al., 2008). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 shows how the IncomeTaxesPaidRefund is calculated using two elements: 
IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifiedAsInvestingActivities and 
IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifiedAsOperatingActivities.  While the Calculation Linkbase has 
described the relations and weights of these elements, it is easy for the users to calculate the 
value of IncomeTaxesPaidRefund using the formula below: 
11 
 
 
 
IncomeTaxesPaidRefund = IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifiedAsInvestingActivities + 
IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifiedAsOperatingActivities                
The third component of XBRL, instance documents, is composed of instances of specific 
elements and tags defined in the taxonomies. Instance documents can be used to store and 
publish different kind of business reporting information including business facts, units, contexts, 
and footnotes(Nutz & Strauß, 2002). Table 4 shows an example of XBRL instance documents. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
2.2.2 BENEFITS OF XBRL 
Prior studies find that XBRL can facilitate the information sharing among various 
stakeholders (Debreceny et al., 2005; Khan, 2006; Pinsker & Li, 2008). For instance, traditional 
financial reports are often generated in different formats and various accounting standards. Only 
end users are familiar with each accounting standards and data formats. The exchange and 
analysis of the information in financial reports are extremely complicated. With the adoption of 
XBRL, accounting principles and financial reports can be mapped into standardized data 
elements, relationships, and references. As accounting information is more reliable and relevant 
in XBRL format, firms can easily adapt to various accounting principles and financial reports 
using corresponding XBRL rules(Cuneo, 2003). The comparison of accounting information is 
much easier than before(Vasarhelyi, Chan, & Krahel, 2010; Zhu & Wu, 2010).  
XBRL can increase the efficiencies of the data integration and processing. The 
introduction of XBRL tags allows computers to process information independently, thus 
reducing the cost associated with data integration and processing(Altova, 2016; Rezaee & Turner, 
2002). The increased efficiencies in the financial data processing also make it possible for 
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auditors, regulators and banks to monitor firm's operations continuously(Rezaee & Turner, 2002), 
which can significantly reduce the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.  
2.2.3 PRELIMINARY STUDY OF XBRL: FIRM CLUSTERING  
2.2.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are several ways to group firms. The most common method is to group them into 
different industries according to firm’s core business. In the U.S., the Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) codes, and more recently the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) codes, have been widely used to classify a firm into a certain industry. These 
classification codes provide an efficient way for investors and policy-makers to analyze 
economic data and reveal the structure of economy(US Census Bureau, 2012). However, the 
code assignments are somewhat static, not capturing the evolvement of firm’s business and 
industry structure. For example, as firms expand or shift their business fields, the codes assigned 
to firms often do not accurately reflect the “natural” grouping of firms. Thus, more "dynamic" 
and "efficient" classification approaches are required in today's highly competitive market.  
When financial statements were not digitized or were in unstructured format, it was 
difficult to derive useful information from them. This has been fundamentally changed since the 
recent adoption of XBRL (XBRL International, 2006). In the U.S., the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has adopted the GAAP taxonomy as a data standard. Specified in XBRL, this 
taxonomy defines a set of financial reporting concepts and their relationships. Earlier 
studies(Zhu & Wu, 2011a; Zhu & Wu, 2011b) show that 87% of the reported data are defined in 
the GAAP taxonomy. The wide use of GAAP taxonomy and XBRL makes it possible for me to 
mine a large quality of financial statements to identify firm clusters. 
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In this study, I model firms and the GAAP Taxonomy elements used by the firms as a 
bipartite "social network". I implement a spectral clustering method and apply it to the "social 
network". The results demonstrate the feasibility of using financial data to identify firm clusters. 
2.2.3.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
In order to group firms based on tags used in their financial statements, I develop a Firm 
Clustering System to collect data, analyze the structure of the financial statements, and create 
clusters. Figure 1 shows the framework of this system.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Data Collection 
I collect the 10-K annual financial statements from 2009 to 2011. If a firm has more than 
one 10-K, I choose to use the earliest one. Since there is no reliable method to match custom data 
elements, my analysis focuses on the elements of GAAP Taxonomy. In the rest of the paper, I 
use the term tag and GAAP element interchangeably. The dataset has 10-K’s of 1799 firms, 
which together use 7021 GAAP elements.  
In the financial statement, some commonly used tags such as "Assets", "CostofRevenue" 
are used by most companies. The strong relationship created by these commonly used tags will 
make most companies belong to the same cluster. Since my main objective is to cluster 
companies based on their usage of specific tags, it is necessary to ignore these commonly used 
tags. Therefore, I delete tags that are used by more than 50 companies. After removing these tags, 
5815 elements are used by this research in the final dataset. 
Clustering Approach 
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Clustering is an efficient way to explore information within certain networks or groups. 
Many clustering algorithms are based on the assumption that the data within the dataset that has 
specific attributes or links (Zha, He, Ding, Simon, & Gu, 2001). In this study, one company uses 
a number of tags specified in the GAAP Taxonomy. Likewise, each tag is also used by several 
companies. By treating tags as attributes of companies, the company-tag relationship can be 
represented as an m-by-n matrix A. In this case, I can identify clusters based on the relationship 
between firms and tags. Figure 2 shows how the clustering works. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
There are numerous algorithms, such as agglomerative clustering (Voorhees, 1986) and 
k-means algorithm (Dhillon & Modha, 2001), which can be used to identify clusters. However, 
most of them can't guarantee global optimization of clusters (Shi & Malik, 2000). Spectral 
clustering is a solution to address this deficiency. The objective of spectral clustering is to find 
the partition of a graph so that the linkages between groups are minimized and the linkages 
within groups are maximized. In graph language, the linkages among groups are called "cuts", 
which can be computed through the total weight of the edges between connected groups. Shi and 
Malik (2000) suggest a co-clustering algorithm to minimize cuts globally. They argue that 
second smallest eigenvalue of Laplacian matrix can be used to find the minimum cut vertex 
partitions in a graph. Dhillon (2001) extends this algorithm. By using the singular value 
decomposition (SVD) approach, he finds that the second left and right singular vectors of a 
normalized matrix provide an optimal solution for co-clustering problem. While Dhillon's 
approach is more efficient and can cluster tags and companies simultaneously, I choose to use 
this approach to identify clusters in the dataset. The main procedures of Dhillon's approach are as 
follows: 
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1. A graph G=(V, E) is a set of vertices V={v1, ,..., vn}, and a set of edges (i, j). Eij is 
equal to the edge weight between vi and vj. W is a symmetrical matrix, where Wij =Eij, if there is 
an edge between i and j, else Wij =0 ; Let matrix D be an diagonal matrix, where D1(i,j)= j ijW , 
D2(i,j)=i ijW   
D= 





2
1
0
0
D
D
 
 
2. Form matrix Wn=D1
-1/2
WD2
-1/2
,    
3. Compute the second singular vectors of Wn and form the vector z2, where u2 and v2 are 
the left and right singular vectors of Wn.  
z2= 
D1−1/2u2
D2−1/2v2
  
4. Run the k-means algorithm on z2 to obtain the desired clusters. 
In this study, there are 1799 firms and 5815 tags, so there are 1799 elements in V and 
5815 elements in E, an edge <fi,tj> exists when firm fi uses tj tag. For simplicity, I set the weight 
of each edge as one and the edges are undirected. Table 5 shows an example of firm-tag matrix. 
For instance, the value of row 2 and column 2 is zero, which indicates that firm1 does not use 
tag1 in its financial statement. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
My clustering algorithm uses k-means algorithm on the singular vectors to obtain the 
desired clusters, thus I need to determine the best value for k. A number of approaches have been 
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developed to determine k value. In this study, I use approach suggest by Schaeffer (2007). He 
considers three measurements to evaluate the fitness of the k value. Among these measurements, 
relative criterion is used to measure the goodness of inter-cluster density. Local criterion focuses 
on the goodness of a clustering structure without external information. In order to optimize both 
local density and global density, Schaeffer (2007) uses the product of the local and relative 
densities to measure the fitness of cluster function. This approach provides an easy way to 
optimize k value in this study. 
2.2.3.3 FINDINGS 
Using the approach mentioned above, I cluster the 1799 companies into 20 clusters. 
Based on Schaffer’s approach, I calculate local density, relative density and total density of 
different cluster numbers. Table 6 shows the distribution of local density, relative density and 
total density in different numbers of clusters.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
In table 6, when k is equal to 20, the total density gets the highest value. Since total 
density is the tradeoff between local density and relative density, I set the k value as 20. Table 7 
shows firm distribution among industry groups according to NAICS. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Next, I try to reveal potential relationship among firms and compare it with standard 
classification code. Figure 3 shows the distribution of major industry in 20 clusters.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
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According to figure 3, cluster 17 only contains one firm, Verde Resources Inc (VRI), an 
exploration stage company. After removing popular tags, it only has seven tags. In addition to 
this outlier case, cluster 5 is also "pure", containing only "Finance and Insurance" (NAICS code 
52) firms. Clusters 8, 14, and 15 are nearly pure with predominantly Finance and Insurance firms. 
An examination of the firms in these clusters shows that firms within each cluster have 
significant similarities in their core businesses. For example, firms in cluster 5 are primarily 
insurance companies, whereas firms in cluster 8 are primarily commercial banks. Utilities (code 
22) firms are dominant in clusters 1 and 7. Similarly, Mining, Quarrying, Oil, Gas Extraction 
(code 21) firms are dominant in cluster 11. 
This case study leads me to hypothesize that certain firm behaviors (such as operation 
mode, investment strategy) determine the contents and structures of firm financial statements. 
Conversely, the contests and structures should help us infer firm characteristics. To preliminarily 
test my hypothesis, I analyze the tags used by firms within each cluster. I rank the tags according 
to the number of firms that use them. The frequently used tags may indicate major financial 
behaviors in these clusters. Table 8 lists the top 10 tags in selected clusters (the list does not 
include the removed elements – those used by more than 50 firms).  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The tags in cluster 1 indicate that firms are regulated public utilities, some of which are 
jointly owned (JointlyOwnedUtilityPlantProportionateOwnershipShare is used by more than 15 
firms in cluster 1). The tags in cluster 2 indicate that most firms are partnerships. The tags in 
cluster 5 indicate that insurance premiums are important to insurance business and the firms are 
also in the reinsurance business. The tags in cluster 6 indicate that firms sell products with 
warranty, use elaborate financing and compensation methods, and are engaged in acquisition of 
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other businesses. All these findings are useful but cannot be derived in any way from firms’ 
NAICS codes. These preliminary findings are very promising to support our hypothesis. Since 
there are hundreds of frequently used tags in 20 clusters, I plan to analyze them all to better 
understand the clustering results and fully test my hypothesis.  
2.2.3.4 CONCLUSION 
Prior research attempt to identify firm groups based on the operation process and output 
of firms. The interrelation and interdependence among firms are not captured. In this study, I 
introduce a spectral clustering method to cluster firms based on XBRL- based financial 
statements. Similar to other "social networks", the firm-tag network has natural groupings of 
firms’ financial statements. My work demonstrates the feasibility of clustering firms based on 
XBRL tags and shows that clusters exhibit interesting common features of the firms within the 
same cluster.  
2.3 SOCIAL MEDIA 
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
According to Kaplan and Haenlein (2010)'s definition, social media is "a group of 
Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 
2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content." (pp. 61). This 
definition suggests that Web2.0 based applications and User Generated Content are the two key 
featuresof social media. Social media is distinct from traditional media as it emphasizes greater 
collaboration among users. At the same time, users on social media are more involved in the 
creation of  content and have more control over it(Kaplan & Haenlein, 2009). As a collective of 
online communications channels, social media is composed of various platforms that can provide 
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different social actions. For instance, Facebook is a popular social media website that allows 
users to send messages, post photos, and share various apps with friends. In contrast, LinkedIn is 
a business-oriented social networking site. The goal of this website is to help users establish 
connections with industry experts and business partners. Currently, social media has become an 
essential part of people's life. Noticing the potential benefits of social media, more and more 
businesses begin to use social media to conduct marketing research, promote products, and build 
long-term relationships with customers.  
2.3.2 BENEFITS OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
Compared to traditional communication channels, social media platforms allow firms to 
reach a large amount of audience at lower cost. This feature makes it easier for businesses to 
increase brand recognition, improve brand loyalty and build stronger relationships with 
customers(He, Tian, Chen, & Chong, 2016). De Vries, Gensler, and Leeflang (2012) analyze the 
social media data of eleven international companies. They find that brand loyalty is positively 
associated with positive posts on social media platform. Trainor, Andzulis, Rapp, and Agnihotri 
(2014) examine the relationship between social media technology usage and customer 
relationship. Their findings suggest that social media technology investments have a positive 
impact on social CRM capabilities as social media can facilitate the interaction between 
businesses and customers. Laroche, Habibi, Richard, and Sankaranarayanan (2012) also find the 
positive relationship between social media and brand loyalty. In general, these studies show that 
social media can enhance self-identity of the community, which in turn, create the value for both 
customers and companies.   
While social media enable businesses to communicate with customers using two-way 
participatory media model, the speed and easiness in transporting and sharing information on 
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social media allow users to acquire unbiased information much easier than before(Yi, Oh, & Kim, 
2013). Blankespoor et al. (2013) use Twitter as the example to examine the relationships 
between social media information disclosure, firm's information environment and information 
asymmetry. They find that firm-initiated news disseminated by Twitter have negative influence 
on abnormal bid-ask spreads. Their finding suggests that dissemination of information via social 
media can significantly reduce information asymmetry in capital markets. He et al. (2016) 
analyze and compare the social media content on the Facebook sites of the three largest 
drugstore chains. They find that customers use social media comments to provide suggestions to 
these companies. He et al's study suggests that businesses can use the knowledge they gain from 
social media to develop better business strategies and improve competitive advantages in the 
market. 
2.4 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Accounting information is a useful tool for banks to evaluate borrowers’ default risk. The 
richer accounting information banks have, the more likely the banks can accurately assess the 
default risk of borrowers(Healy & Palepu, 2001). Among various tools providing accounting 
information, financial statement has been widely used by analysts, investors and the government 
in the capital markets(Chong & Zhu, 2012). Traditionally, financial statement was prepared and 
generated in unstructured format. Many resources were wasted on locating, converting, and 
understanding accounting information in financial statement. The application of XBRL makes it 
possible for users to retrieve accounting information in a more efficient way. Compared to 
traditional approaches, XBRL can define taxonomies to specify a set of concepts. When all users 
are using the same taxonomies, data in XBRL format can be easily shared across various 
applications and platforms(Farewell, 2006). A research conducted by Pinsker and Li (2008) 
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indicates that XBRL benefits include cost savings, increased data processing capability, 
increased efficiency, decreased data redundancy, and decreased cost of bookkeeping. Overall, 
XBRL based disclosures have the potential to reduce information risk and information 
asymmetry in the capital markets(Kim, Kim, & No, 2011). While information risk and 
information asymmetry are closely associated with bank loan price, I expect a negative relation 
between the adoption of XBRL and cost of bank loan. Based on this argument, I hypothesize: 
H1a: Borrowers that adopt XBRL enjoy more favorable loan prices 
The main shortcomings of traditional media are that: 1) it can't disseminate the 
information to a broad set of stakeholders; 2) information disseminated to the markets are often 
biased (Bushee et al., 2010; Miller, 2006; Soltes, 2010). For instance, Heinle and Verrecchia 
(2015) suggest that the extent to which firms bias their disclosure depends on the content of  the 
information disclosed by other firms or if there is a potential value to firms' stock prices. Frankel 
and Li (2004) suggest that large firms are concerned by more followers. Analysts’ 
recommendations on large firms are often less biased than on small firms. Coombs (2007) finds 
that negative information created by hostile competitors often harm firm's image and value. 
Compared to traditional media, social media utilizes a two way broadcast model to disseminate 
information. This feature enable firms to efficiently reach a large number of stakeholders (Yi et 
al., 2013). Basically, the data available on social media can be classified into two categories: 
firm-initiated information and user generated information (Bushee et al., 2010; Lee, Hutton, & 
Shu, 2015). Firm-initiated information is created by firms and reflects firms' own opinion. On the 
other hand, postings or comments created by general users belong to user-generated information 
that represents users' opinions and views. Considering the huge amount of users on social media, 
user generated information can provide a source of value-relevant advices to other stakeholders. 
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For instance, Antweiler and Frank (2004) apply sentiment analysis to analyze 1.5 million 
messages from Yahoo! Finance.  The result of their study shows that postings on social media 
are positively associated with firm's stock returns on the next day. Das and Chen (2007) analyze 
small investor's sentiment on stock message boards. They find that social media postings are 
related to stock index levels, volumes and volatility. Chen et al. (2014) use posts and comments 
on Seeking Alpha.com to examine the effect of users' sentiment on stock prices. They find that 
negative sentiment can negatively predict stock returns in a three-month period. Overall, the 
studies above imply that the sentiment in large amount of postings is an important indicator of 
firm's potential risks and values. Since borrower's risks are positively associated with bank loan 
prices, I have the hypothesis below: 
H1b: Borrowers with more positive postings and comments on social media enjoy more 
favorable loan prices. 
A number of studies have examined the impact of firm size on information asymmetry 
and loan terms. For instance, Dennis and Sharpe (2005) identify three influence factors related to 
firm size. The first factor is the bargaining power. Most large firms are well organized and they 
have significant profits. The reputation built over long time makes it easier for large firms to 
build a close relationship with lenders. As a result, the loan bargaining power of large firms is 
stronger than small firms. From lenders' perspective , it's reasonable for them to offer favorite  
loan contracts to large firms since the creditworthiness of large firms is easier to evaluate 
(Diamond, 1989). On the other hand, large firms are less likely to rely on the loans from single 
lender and market. More borrowing options enable large firms to receive relatively good terms 
from multiple lenders. The second influence factor is the transaction cost. Compared to larger 
firms, the amount of small firm loan is relatively small. The fixed costs incurred by the 
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transaction make it harder for lenders to get economies of scale from small loans. Thus, lenders 
are reluctant to offer favorable loan terms to small firms. The third influence factor is 
information asymmetry. Shen and Reuer (2005) find that large firms have tighter regulation 
requirements to disclose information, thus large firms is more efficient at minimizing 
information asymmetry. Easley and O'hara (2004) suggest that large firms disclose more 
information than small firms, which result in reduced information asymmetry and lower cost of 
capital.  
Beside the amount of information disclosed, firm size also has negative impact on the 
quality and scope of information disclosed. For instance, press is an important tool to 
disseminate information generated by sources like analysts, legal suits, and auditor changes. 
Miller (2006) examines the role of press in the rebroadcasting stage. He finds that press is often 
biased toward coverage of large firms because they tend to cater to interests of main readers. Das, 
Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan (1998) study the determinant of cross-section differences in 
analyst forecasting. They find that large firms are generally followed by more analysts. Analyst 
forecasts for large firms are less biased than those for small firms. Das et al's study shows that 
small firms have less opportunity to get favorable loan terms due to the disadvantages of 
information dissemination in traditional media channels. In general, prior findings indicate that 1) 
the information of the small firms is often opaque; 2) disclosures of small firms are often biased; 
3) disclosures of small firms cannot reach the public in a broad and correct manner. These 
studies also imply that banks may have to rely more on alternative tools (e.g., social media and 
XBRL) to evaluate the risk of small firms. Based on this argument, I hypothesize: 
H2a:  The effect of XBRL adoption on bank loan prices is stronger for small firms than 
for large firms. 
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H2b: The effect of social media sentiment on bank loan prices is stronger for small firms 
than for large firms. 
Some studies find that prior borrowing relationship is associated with loan price. For 
instance, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) find that the scope of a relationship increase the 
probability of getting loans from that bank. Berger and Udell (1995) suggest that prior 
relationships will generate valuable information of borrower quality. This argument is confirmed 
by their findings, which longer banking relationships are associated with lower interest rates and 
fewer collateral requirements. Petersen and Rajan (1994) examine the relationship among prior 
relationships, loan availability and loan cost. They find that while prior relationships do affect 
the loan availability, there are only very small effects on the loan price. Bharath, Dahiya, 
Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011) 's research focuses on the main risks in bank loan. They identify 
three effects of prior loan relationships on bank loan. The first effect is adverse selection 
concerns reduction. When the lenders have prior relationships with the borrowers, multiple 
interactions allow lenders to collect borrowers' inside information, which is hard to gather 
through other channels. In this case, adverse selection risks are reduced. The second effect is 
syndicate moral hazard reduction. Syndicate moral hazard results from information asymmetries 
among lenders. In the syndicated loan, the lead lender is responsible for the cost of monitoring 
borrowers. Since loan is divided among more than one lender, the lead lender may not endeavor 
to monitor the borrowers efficiently as the single loan. In order to compensate for the potential 
loss caused by inefficient monitoring, the other syndicate members will demand tighter loan 
terms. As prior relationships reduce information asymmetry and lower the cost of future 
monitoring, the possibility of syndicate moral hazard is reduced. The third effect is borrower 
moral hazard reduction. Borrower moral hazard is a risk results from information asymmetry 
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between borrowers and lenders. The borrower moral hazard is raised when lenders cannot 
observe or predict the borrower’s risky activities (Hölmstrom, 1979). As prior loan relationships 
make it easier for lenders to monitor and control the borrower, the possibility of borrower moral 
hazard is reduced. As lenders can benefit a lot from the information gathered from prior 
borrowing relationship, they will be less likely to rely on other information sources (Berger & 
Udell, 1995; Harhoff & Körting, 1998; Petersen & Rajan, 1994). On the other hand, when 
lenders have limited access to the private information of new borrowers, they may have to rely 
more on other information sources such as XRBL and social media to evaluate borrowers’ risks. 
Based on this argument, I hypothesize: 
H3a: The effect of XBRL adoption on bank loan prices is stronger for loans in new 
relationships than for loans in existing relationships  
H3b: The effect of social media sentiment on bank loan prices is stronger for loans in 
new relationships than for loans in existing relationships  
A syndicated loan is a loan issued to the borrowers jointly by more than one lender. The 
motivation of syndication stems from lenders' demands to spread risk, enhance income or reduce 
costs(Pennacchi, 1988). In a syndicated loan, each participant is responsible for a share of the 
loan. And, only the lead lender supervises the arrangement of the syndication including loan 
terms negotiation, borrower monitoring and administration of repayments(Simons, 1993). A risk 
will rise when there is information asymmetry between lead lender and other participants. Sufi 
(2007) suggests that the lead lender may not endeavor to monitor the borrowers since borrower 
monitoring is costly and lead lender owns only part of the loan. He calls this kind of risk as 
syndicate moral hazard. Consistent with Sufi's finding, Hasan et al. (2012) find that syndicate 
members rely more on public information due to risk of the syndicate moral hazard. Since XBRL 
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and social media allow users to retrieve public information more efficiently, I expect that lenders 
will rely more on XBRL and social media sentiment in loan contracting. Thus, I hypothesize: 
H4a: The effect of XBRL adoption on bank loan prices is stronger for syndicated loans 
than for sole-owner loans 
H4b: The effect of social media sentiment on bank loan prices is stronger for syndicated 
loans than for sole-owner loans 
Banks use various non-price terms to minimize information problems and control loan 
risks. The most popular non-price loan terms are loan maturities, collateral, and covenants(Hasan 
et al., 2012). Many studies find that higher information asymmetry, greater uncertainty and lower 
firm quality of the borrowers lead to shorter maturities and more requirements of collateral 
(Barclay & Smith, 1995; Ortiz-Molina & Penas, 2008; Rajan & Winton, 1995). For instance, 
Flannery (1986) suggests that the relationship between borrower's quality and loan maturity is 
linear. Borrowers with good quality may prefer shorter maturity when the transaction costs are 
high. Diamond (1991a) examines the determinants of loan maturities from two aspects: 
information asymmetries and the liquidity risk of refinancing. He argues that long maturity 
allows borrowers to minimize liquidity risk, and borrowers with average quality will prefer long 
maturity to avoid changes of loan prices. On the other hand, short-term loan enables lenders to 
monitor borrowers more frequently. Thus, low quality borrowers are more likely to receive loans 
with short maturities. Diamond (1991a) points out that even both high quality borrowers and low 
quality borrowers use short term loan, they are driven by different mechanisms: different 
bargaining power determinates that low quality borrowers are forced to accept short term loan 
while high quality borrowers choose short term loan on their own initiative. Barclay and Smith 
(1995) and Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) get similar results with Flannery's findings. Both of 
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their studies suggest that shorter maturities are useful in solving information problems. The 
reason is that lenders can periodically gather borrowers' private information through short-term 
loan renewal processes. Applying Diamond's theory, Bharath et al. (2011) examines the effects 
of lending relationships on loan contract terms. They find that lenders are more likely to monitor 
low quality borrowers more intensively, and the quality of borrowers is key determination of 
loan maturity length. In sum, the literature suggests that shorter maturities facilitate continual 
monitoring, which in turn reduces the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. 
As I discussed above, the adoption of XBRL and social media can reduce information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers significantly. Thus, the substitution effect of XBRL 
and social media will make loan maturity less important to lenders. At the same time, since 
sentiment on social media sites is an important indicator of firm's risks, it is reasonable for us to 
believe that social media sentiment is positively associated with the length of loan maturity. Thus, 
I hypothesize: 
H5a: Borrowers that adopt XBRL have longer loan maturities. 
H5b: Borrowers with more positive postings and comments on social media have longer 
loan maturities. 
The literature has found that many factors including limited contract 
enforceability(Albuquerque & Hopenhayn, 2004; Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Cooley, Marimon, 
& Quadrini, 2004), high monitoring cost(Border & Sobel, 1987; Boyd & Smith, 1993; Gale & 
Hellwig, 1985; Lacker, 1998; Townsend, 1979; Williamson, 1986), high loan risk(Holmstrom & 
Tirole, 1997), efficient monitoring(Rajan & Winton, 1995),  and adverse selection(Berger, 
Espinosa-Vega, Frame, & Miller, 2011; Duarte, 2011) are related to the use of loan collateral. 
Most of these findings can be explained by adverse selection models and borrower moral hazard 
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models(Bharath et al., 2011). According to adverse selection models, collateral and interest rate 
are complementary. Higher quality borrowers may choose lower premiums without collateral, 
while low quality borrowers will prefer higher premiums with collateral. At this point, collateral 
plays a role in signaling borrower quality (Beaudry & Poitevin, 1995; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; 
Whette, 1983). Borrower moral hazard models explain the motivation of collateral from another 
aspect. These models suggest that the use of collateral is to compensate for potential losses 
caused by information asymmetries. Banks are more likely to require collateral from borrowers 
with low information transparency, while borrowers with high information transparency are less 
likely to be required to do so(Holmstrom & Tirole, 1997; Stulz & Johnson, 1985). In general, the 
literature indicates that information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders play an important 
role in the use of loan collateral. As the adoption of XBRL can reduce information asymmetry, I 
expect that the adoption of XBRL will lessen lenders' need for collateral. On the other hand, 
positive sentiment on social media sites indicates better borrowers' quality and lower loan risks. 
Therefore, I expect that lenders are less likely to require collateral from the borrowers with more 
positive sentiment. Based on these arguments, I hypothesize: 
H6a: Banks are less likely to require collateral from borrowers that adopt XBRL  
H6b: Banks are less likely to require collateral from borrowers with more positive 
postings and comments on social media.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 BANK LOAN PRICING ANALYTICS SYSTEM  
The objectives of this study are to investigate whether and how the adoption of XBRL 
and social media sentiment affect bank loan price. In order to achieve these objectives, I develop 
a Bank Loan Pricing Analytics System (BLPAS) to collect, integrate, and analyze data from 
multiple data resources. Figure 4 shows the framework for loan price analytics. This system is 
composed of three key components: data collection module, data integration module and data 
processing module.  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
3.1.1 DATA COLLECTION MODULE 
The Data Collection Module manages the data collected from various data sources. This 
module integrates a number of data collection tools.   
1. Web-crawling:  currently, many social media tools offer application programming 
interfaces (API) for users to retrieve data from their platforms. For instance, on Twitter platform, 
REST API allows developers to access core Twitter data including author profile, follower data, 
and user information. Streaming APIs enable users to retrieve updates of Tweets 
synchronously(Twitter, 2016). As the social media data sources used in this study do not provide 
APIs for data tracking, I develop a web-crawling application to retrieve the content from the 
websites. By analyzing the URL and particular HTML tags of web pages, this application allows 
users to retrieve posting and comments published on Seeking Alpha and Yahoo finance. 
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2. HTML parsing and RSS:  Sec.gov offers RSS feeds which enable users to track the 
URL of submitted financial statements. In order to retrieve financial statements from Sec.gov, I 
develop a HTML parsing application to download and analyze the data. As XBRL based 
financial statement uses XML and XSD as the file extensions, this program can easily 
distinguish XBRL based financial statements from traditional financial statements. 
3. Manual coping: Thomson and Compustat database offer extensive functions for users 
to retrieve information, generate report through pre-defined criteria and Excel add-in. Therefore, 
I manually collect bank loan data and firm accounting data from these two databases.  
3.1.2 DATA INTEGRATION MODULE 
A big challenge of loan data analytics is to integrate heterogeneous unstructured data 
collected from different sources. Built on Apache Hadoop and Hive platform, the Data 
Integration Module enables flexible data summarization, easy data querying, and analysis of 
large volumes of data. The Data Integration Module is composed of two components: ETL 
agents and Distributed Storage Platform. 
 1. ETL agents: The ETL agents aim to extract data from heterogeneous data sources, 
clean collected data, and load the processed data into distributed storage platform. ETL agents 
are deployed as server side applications using PHP and C# programming language. In order to 
process different types of unstructured data such as txt files, Excel files, html files, I develop 
multiple agents to extract and transform unstructured data. For instance, HTML pages contain 
HTML tags and ads in HTML pages, which cannot be processed by Distributed Storage Platform 
directly. Thus, HTML agent is used to analyze the structure of web pages, and to retrieve the 
content of postings and comments. After cleaning and mapping data collected from web pages, 
HTML agent loads the transformed social media data into Distributed Storage Platform.  
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2. Hive Based Distributed Storage Platform (HBDSP): Bank loan price analysis involves 
multiple big datasets including social media data, XBRL data, firm financial data, and bank loan 
data. The large amount of data generated from various data sources makes it hard for traditional 
storage platform to manage data with reliability and availability. In this case, Hive based 
distributed storage platform (HBDSP) provides a flexible solution with the capabilities required 
to support large scale datasets. The main advantages of HBDSP are that datasets are stored on 
Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS), which offers key features such as scalability and 
redundancy on Hadoop platform. The SQL like Hive query language enables users who are 
familiar with SQL to query and manage the data more efficiently(Chong & Shi, 2015; Thusoo et 
al., 2009). Figure 5 shows the user interface of Hive Based Distributed Storage Platform.  
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
The main components of HBDSP include user interface, driver, compiler, metadata store , 
and execution engine. HBDSP allows users to use ODBC and JDBC API to create, insert, update, 
and query structured data. Based on Leverenz (2016) 's approach, I define the query flow of 
HBDSP  which includes the following steps: 
    1. Data Analysis Module sends query to HBDSP through ODBC or JDBC API.  
    2. ODBC or JDBC driver sends query to compiler. 
    3. Compiler parses the query to check the syntax and the requirements of the query. 
    4. The compiler sends a request to Metadata store. After Metadata store returns the 
metadata, compiler generates the execution plan. 
    5. Execution engine executes the execution plan. 
32 
 
 
 
    6. The execution engine sends the execution job to JobTracker, which is responsible 
for the job assignment.  
    7. Data nodes return the results to driver through execution engine. 
    8. Driver returns the results of query to Data Analysis Module through ODBC or 
JDBC API.    
3.1.3 DATA ANALYSIS MODULE 
The Data Analysis Module manages serials of analysis tools, which can be used to 
conduct content analysis, sentimental analysis, statistical analysis et al. The key components of 
this module include data exchange component, sentimental analysis tools and statistical analysis 
tools. 
1. Data exchange component. Bank loan price analysis involves various data formats 
including txt file, csv file and database file et al. The transformation and sharing of data among 
different applications are extremely important to data analysis. Data exchange component 
provides a serial of functions to facilitate data exchange between analysis applications and Hive 
platform. On the one hand, this component uses ODBC and JDBC API to retrieve and 
manipulate data stored on Hive distributed storage system. On the other hand, this component 
outputs results with multiple data formats, which can be accessed by various analysis tools. For 
instance, SPSS is a major statistical tools used in this study. However, SPSS cannot access data 
stored on Hive platform directly. The data exchange component offers a bi-directional data 
exchange between SPSS and Hive platform with the following steps:  1). Users issue search 
requests using standard SQL language. 2). Data exchange component transforms and sends 
search requests to Hive platform. 3). Hive platform returns the results to Data exchange 
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component. 4). Data exchange component transforms the format of the results to the data format 
supported by SPSS. 5). Data exchange component sends the transformed results to SPSS. 
2. Sentimental analysis tool. In this study, sentimental analysis tool is used to analyze 
users' opinions expressed within social media postings and comments. Two sentiment scores are 
calculated in the study. The first one is general sentiment score. This score is used to identify 
general opinions of the users. I use AlchemyAPI (AlchemyAPI Inc, 2016) to calculate general 
sentiment score. Compared to other Sentimental analysis tools, AlchemyAPI adopts hybrid 
approaches including linguistic techniques, statistical analysis techniques and large-scale 
learning techniques to identify the contents of sentences and phrases. These techniques enable 
AlchemyAPI to better understand the sentiment expressed in the content and mine key entities 
and topics more accurately(IBM, 2016). The second score is finance-related sentiment, which is 
used to identify opinions related to financial information. Following Nann, Krauss, and Schoder 
(2013)'s suggestion, I calculate finance-related sentiment based on predefined lists of positive(e.g. 
invest, long, earn, etc) and negative words(e.g. bailout, breakout, sell, etc). The final sentiment is 
the combination of general sentiment and finance-related sentiment. 
3. Statistical analysis tools. Statistical analysis tools include two popular statistical 
packages: SPSS and R. As a frequently used statistical analysis tool, SPSS allows users to 
conduct most complex statistical analyses and easily generate summary reports, charts and 
descriptive statistics (Hayes & Matthes, 2009). In this study, SPSS is used to conduct most of the 
statistical analyses and generate reports of the analyses. Another statistical analysis tool used in 
this study is R. As an integrated suite of statistical analysis, R integrates most popular statistical 
techniques and has more than 4000 packages for data analysis. The R programming language 
allows users to add, use, and modify functionalities. This feature makes R more extensible than 
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other statistical analysis tools(The R Foundation, 2016). In this study, I conduct robustness 
analysis on R environment.  
Besides the tools introduced above, data analysis module also provides simple and 
flexible interfaces for future system expansion. Future analytic applications can use JDBC API, 
ODBC API and XML to exchange data with current analysis tools and Hive storage platform.  
3.2 DATA SOURCE 
In this study, XBRL data is collected from the archive of financial statements on 
www.sec.gov. According to SEC's requirements, the adoption of XBRL is phased in three stages. 
In the first stage, all domestic and foreign large accelerated filers matching certain conditions 
(use U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP),  have a worldwide public float of 
greater than $5 billion as of the end of the second fiscal quarter of their most recently completed 
fiscal year, fiscal periods ending on or after June 15, 2009) are required to provide financial 
statement information in XBRL. In the second stage, all other domestic and foreign large 
accelerated filers matching certain conditions (use U.S. GAAP, fiscal period ending on or after 
June 15, 2010), are required to include interactive data (XBRL) in their financial statements. In 
the third stage, all remaining filers including foreign private issuers using International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) matching certain conditions(fiscal periods ending on or after June 15, 
2011), are required to include interactive data(XBRL) in their financial reporting(Securities 
Exchange Commission, 2009).  Since the adoption of XBRL was not mandatory for all 
companies from 2009 to 2011, some companies adopted XBRL while others did not during three 
years. This circumstance makes it possible for me to examine the impact of XBRL adoption on 
bank loan price. Before June 15, 2009, no companies were required to provide financial 
statement information in XBRL. The adoption of XBRL did not have any impact on bank loan 
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price before 2009. On the other hand, the rule of SEC requires all companies to submit their 
financial information in XBRL after June 15, 2011. Bank loan price were not related to the 
adoption of XBRL after 2011 since all borrowers included XBRL in their financial statement 
after that deadline. For the above reasons, I collect data of XBRL adoption in the period from 
2009 to 2011.  
Bank loan data is obtained from Thomson one database. Thomson one provides detailed 
financial information such as earnings estimates, financial news, transaction data, mergers and 
acquisitions, ownership profiles and analysts’ reports. More importantly, this database contains 
over 92,000 syndicated loans since 1982. Key loan terms such as corporate profile of borrowers 
and lenders, deal dates, interest rate, collateral, covenants, maturities are well covered by this 
database(Thomson Reuters, 2016).  While Thomson one provides detailed loan information, 
some firm-specific accounting information such as tangibility, profitability, financial ratios, 
leverage are not included in the database. In this case, I use Compustat to obtain firm-specific 
accounting information. As I only examine the adoption of XBRL from 2009 to 2011, the bank 
loans made at the end of 2011 enable me to evaluate the comprehensive impact of XBRL on 
bank loan price. Thus, I collect bank loan data in a period from August 1, 2011 to December 31, 
2011. To ensure data integrity and data consistency, I use ticker symbols to match the records 
collected from Thomson one, Compustat and SEC.gov.   
Social media data is collected from two financial social networking websites, Yahoo 
Finance and Seeking alpha. Yahoo Finance is a leading financial data website, which has more 
than 70 million visitors each month. This website provides financial news, stock quotes, press 
releases, financial reports and financial analysis(Wikipedia, 2016). As an important part of 
Yahoo finance, Yahoo Message Board allows investors and analysts to share their opinions and 
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views on companies all over the world. Figure 6 shows the message board of Microsoft on 
Yahoo finance. One key feature of Yahoo message board is that for each post on the board, users 
can reply and click the sentiment label to indicate their preferences to the post. The huge 
amounts of posts and comments on Yahoo Message Board make it easier for me to mine 
sentiments of millions of users. The second social media data source, Seeking Alpha is one of the 
biggest financial social media websites in the U.S. The aim of Seeking Alpha is to provide 
professional opinion and analysis written by experts(Chen et al., 2014). In order to assure quality 
of the articles, the articles submitted to Seeking Alpha are reviewed by a panel. The breadths and 
depth of the articles on Seeking Alpha are much better than other websites(Seeking Alpha, 
2016a). Similar to Yahoo finance, users of Seeking Alpha are free to leave comments on articles 
that they are interested in. Figure 7 shows the example articles and comments of Microsoft on 
Seeking Alpha.  
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
Before making a loan decision, it requires a long time for lenders to collect borrower's 
information and evaluate potential loan risks. Therefore, social media views and opinions 
published in a short time period may not be fully noticed or evaluated by lenders. In order to 
improve the accuracy of this study, I collect social media data in the four-month period prior to 
the loan announcement date.   
3.3 SAMPLE SELECTION 
In order to ensure the accuracy and consistency of the data collected from multiple data 
sources. I use the following procedures to form the sample:  
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1. First, I retrieve all loan-facility-level records from Thomson one database in a period 
from August 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011. While the data of private or non-US companies are 
not completely covered by SEC.gov and social media websites, I limit my sample to listed US 
companies.  
2. Following Hasan et al. (2012)'s definition, I measure the loan price as the basis points 
over LIBOR  or LIBOR equivalent. In this step, I exclude all records without available LIBOR 
price.  
3. Collect borrowers' 10-K submission from SEC.gov in a period from January 1, 2009 to 
December 31, 2011. Exclude all borrowers without submission of 10-k during this period and 
borrowers being delisted during this period. I also manually check the names of all borrowers. 
Borrowers without consistent names on SEC.gov and Thomson one are excluded.  
4. Collect borrower-related articles, and comments from Yahoo message board and 
Seeking Alpha in a four-month period prior to each loan announcement date. Borrowers without 
posts on these two sites or have inconsistent company names are excluded.  
Finally, I get 554 loan records. Table 9 shows the details of sample selection. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
3.4 VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
3.4.1 BANK LOAN PRICE 
Loan price is one of the key variables in this study. A number of prior studies use spread 
as the measurement of loan price (Beatty, Weber, & Yu, 2008; Hasan et al., 2012; Liu, Seyyed, 
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& Smith, 1999; Zhang, 2008). Following these studies, I use the initial interest rate spread over 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to measure bank loan price.  
3.4.2 THE ADOPTION OF XBRL  
Following Kim et al. (2011)'s approach, I construct the adoption of XBRL measure by 
examining borrowers ' 10-K submission from 2009 to 2011. The value of this variable equals to 
the frequency of the adoption of XBRL between 2009 and 2011. For instance, if a firm submitted 
its financial information in XBRL once between 2009 and 2011, then the value of this variable is 
equal to one. Since the time period only covers three fiscal years, the scale of XBRL adoption is 
from 0 to 3. Based on the discussion in chapter 2, I expect that the frequency of XBRL adoption 
is negatively related to loan prices.  
3.4.3 SOCIAL MEDIA SENTIMENT 
The sentiment on social media websites reflects user's opinions about firm's risks and 
values. According to prior discussion, I expect that social media sentiment is negatively related 
to loan prices. Based on the algorithm provided by IBM(AlchemyAPI Inc, 2016), I calculate 
social media sentiment using the following stages: 
1. Calculate financial terms sentiment score of each post  
 
              Finseni     =    
( 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 _𝑃(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑖)− 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 _𝑁( 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑖) 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 _𝐴𝑙𝑙 (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑖)
                                          (1) 
 
Where 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡_𝑃(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖) returns the number of positive financial terms in post i. 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡_𝑁( 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖)  returns the number of negative financial terms in post i. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡_𝐴𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖) 
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returns the number of all financial terms in post i. This formula returns the finance-related 
sentiment score of post i.  
2. Calculate general sentiment score,  
 
              StandSeni       =  AlchemyAPI( posti )                                                                            (2) 
 
Where posti  is the content of post i. By calling AlchemyAPI, this formula returns the general 
sentiment score of post i. 
3. Calculate total sentiment score,  
 
              Sentiment_Score   =   
( 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑛 𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟎   + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛 𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟎 ) 
2𝑛
                        (3) 
 
Where FinSeni  is the finance-related sentiment score of post i. StandSeni is general sentiment 
score of post i. n is the number of all posts over a specific time period. This formula returns the 
total sentiment score of a company over a specific time period.  
3.4.4 CONTROL VARIABLES 
Prior studies find that some firm characteristics also affect loan price (Graham, Li, & Qiu, 
2008; Qian & Strahan, 2007; Wu et al., 2011). Following these studies, I control for several firm 
characteristics and loan characteristics in my models.  
 Log(Asset), prior studies find that firm size has positive impact on information 
transparency(Dennis & Sharpe, 2005). The information of the small firms is often opaque. While 
information transparency plays an important role in loan prices, I expect that firm size has a 
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negative impact on bank loan prices. In this study, I use the natural logarithm of the total assets 
of borrowers as the measurement of firm size. 
Leverage, I define leverage as the total debts including long-term debt and short-term 
debt divided by firm book assets. As an important indicator of default risk and liquidity  
risk(Diamond, 1991a; Graham et al., 2008), high leverage often suggests that firms have higher 
default risk and liquidity risk. Thus, I expect leverage is positively associated with loan prices.  
Current Ratio and Cash to Debt Ratio, in this study, current ratio is defined as the current 
assets divided by current liability, cash to debt ratios is measured by total cash divided by total 
debt. According to the literature, lower current ratios and lower cash to debt ratios suggest that 
firms have higher default risk (Graham et al., 2008). Thus, I expect a negative relation between 
current ratio, cash to debt ratio and loan prices.  
Profitability, I measure profitability as Net income over total sales. While higher 
profitability means lower loan risks, I expect that profitability is negatively associated with loan 
prices.  
Interest Coverage, I measure interest coverage as Earnings Before Interest & Tax (EBIT) 
divided by total interest expense. This variable reflects firm's ability to pay the interest charges 
on time. Low interest coverage often suggests that firm does not have enough cash to pay off 
interest charges. Thus, I expect that interest coverage is negatively associated with loan prices.  
Tangibility, I define tangibility as property, plant, and equipment divided by total asset. 
As tangible assets are potential guarantee for banks to recover from default (Hasan et al., 2012), I 
expect a negative relationship between tangibility and loan prices.  
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MB, this variable is defined as market to book ratio that indicates growth opportunities of 
a firm. Since better growth opportunities result in lower loan cost(Kothari et al., 2009), I expect 
that MB is negatively associated with loan prices.  
Loan Size, I define Loan Size as the total amount of bank loan. Hasan et al. (2012) 
suggest that lenders can achieve economies of scale when offering large amount of loan. As large 
loan size is associated with lower lending cost, I expect a negative relationship between Loan 
Size and loan prices.  
Prior Relations, is a dummy variable that is equal to one when there is a previous lending 
relationship between lenders and borrowers, it equals zero otherwise. A number of studies have 
examined the relationship between repeated borrowing and loan prices. Boot (2000) argues that 
repeated interaction between the same lender and borrower will facilitate production of durable 
and reusable information. Bharath et al. (2011) suggest that previous borrowing relationship can 
reduce information asymmetries, and lending cost. According to their studies, previous 
borrowing relationship contributes to 10–17 bps lower loan spreads. Based on the findings of 
literature, I expect a negative relationship between Prior Relations and loan prices.  
Z-Score, Z-Score is a measurement of default risk. Follow Hasan et al. (2012) 's  
approach, I define Z-Score as (1.2*Working capital+1.48Retained earnings + 3.3*EBIT + 
0.999*Sales)/Total assets. As lower Z-Score is associated with higher default risk, I expect a 
negative relationship between Z-Score and loan prices 
The literature finds that some other variables such as loan type, loan purpose and industry 
also have impact on loan prices(Graham et al., 2008; Hasan et al., 2012). Following these studies, 
I control for loan type, loan purpose, and industry effects. In this study, loan type is classified 
into five categories: term loan, term loan B-D, revolver, 364-Day Facility and others. Loan 
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purpose is classified into seven categories: acquisition lines, LBO, Takeover, debt repayment, 
corporate purpose, working capital, and others. For the industry effects, I use one digit SIC 
dummies to control for it.  
3.5 EMPIRICAL MODELS 
To examine the effect of adoption of XBRL and social media on bank loan price, I 
specify the following empirical models: 
   Log(Spread) = f(Constant, XBRL adoption,  Firm characteristics, Loan characteristics, 
                              Industry effects)                                                                                (4) 
The first model is used to test whether and how the adoption of XBRL affect bank loan 
price. The explicit form of equation (1) above is represented as follows:  
    Log(Spread) = α0 + α1(XBRL adoption) + α2 log(Assets) + α3Leverage 
                             + α4Current Ratio + α5Cash to Debt Ratio + α6Interest Coverage 
                             + α7Tangibility + α8Profitability + α9M/B + α10Log(Loan size)  
                             + α11Prior Relation + Loan type effect + Loan purpose effect  
                             + Industry effect + ε                                                                         (5) 
Where Log(Spread) is  the natural logarithm of initial interest rate spread over London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR). XBRL adoption equals to the frequency of the adoption of XBRL 
between 2009 and 2011. I expect a negative relationship between  XBRL adoption,  firms 
size(Assets), Current Ratio, Cash to Debt Ratio, Interest Coverage, Tangibility, Profitability, 
M/B, Loan Size, Prior Relation and loan prices and a positive relationship between Leverage and 
loan prices.  
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The second model is used to examine the effect social media sentiment on loan prices by 
using the following model:  
   Log(Spread) = f(Constant, Social Media Sentiment,  Firm-specific variables ,   
                               loan-specific variables, other control variables)                            (6) 
The explicit form of equation (6) above is represented as follows:  
    Log(Spread) = α0 + α1(Social Media Sentiment) + α2 log(Assets) + α3Leverage 
                             + α4Current Ratio + α5Cash to Debt Ratio + α6Interest Coverage 
                             + α7Tangibility + α8Profitability + α9M/B + α10Log(Loan size)  
                             + α11Prior Relation + Loan type effect + Loan purpose effect  
                             + Industry effect + ε                                                                         (7) 
Where social media sentiment is the sentiment score calculated by formulas mentioned in section 
3.4.3. I expect a negative relationship between  social media sentiment,  firms size(Assets), 
Current Ratio, Cash to Debt Ratio, Interest Coverage, Tangibility, Profitability, M/B, Loan size, 
Prior Relation and loan prices and a positive relationship between Leverage and loan prices.  
In the third model, I add the interaction of social media sentiment and XBRL adoption in 
the regression. The model examines the comprehensive effects of XBRL adoption and social 
media sentiment on bank loan price: 
     Log(Spread) = f(Constant, XBRL adoption, Social Media Sentiment, 
                              XBRL adoption × social media sentiment,  Firm-specific variables,  
                              loan-specific variables, other control variables)                             (8) 
   The explicit form of equation (8) above is represented as follows:  
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     Log(Spread) = α0 + α1(XBRL adoption) +α2(Social Media Sentiment)  
                             +α3(XBRL adoption×  Social Media Sentiment) + α4 log(Assets) 
                             +α5Leverage + α6Current Ratio + α7Cash to Debt Ratio 
                             +α8Interest Coverage + α9Tangibility + α10Profitability + α11M/B 
                             +α12Log(Loan size) + α13Prior Relation + Loan type effect 
                             +Loan purpose effect + Industry effect + ε                                       (9)       
    I expect that interaction of social media sentiment and XBRL adoption is negatively associated 
with loan cost.  
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4. FINDINGS AND ANALYSES 
In this chapter, I will discuss the results of the regression analysis:  The descriptive 
statistics of the dependent and independent variables are provided in section 4.1. The correlation 
analyses between dependent and independent variables are also discussed in this section. Section 
4.2 and section 4.3 presents the regression results related to the effects of XBRL adoption, and 
social media sentiment on loan prices. After discussing the results of robust test in section 4.4, 
section 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 investigate whether the effect of XBRL and social media sentiment on 
bank loan prices varies with borrower characteristics and loan characteristics (e.g. new 
relationship, syndication, and firm size). Finally, section 4.8 discusses the regression results 
regarding the relations between the adoption of XBRL, social media sentiment and non-price 
terms. 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 10 presents descriptive statistics for dependent variables, independent variables and 
a set of control variables in our models. The mean of bank loan spread is 199.621 with a median 
value of 175, minimum value of 5 and maximum value of 1150. The bank loan spread highly 
dispersed from its mean value with the standard deviation of 123.194. The mean of XBRL  is 
0.894 with a median value of 1, minimum value of 0 and maximum value of 2. This result 
indicates that the maximum times borrowers adopted XBRL between 2009 and 2011 is two, and 
most of the borrowers only used XBRL one time during that period. The mean of Seeking 
Aplaha sentiment is 0.217 with a median value of 0.221, minimum value of -0.706, and 
maximum value of 1.200. The mean of Yahoo finance sentiment is 0.026 with a median value of 
-0.002, minimum value of 1.161, and maximum value of 1.350. The statistics of two social 
media sites show that the sentiment of Seeking Aplaha is more positive than the sentiment of 
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Yahoo finance. Some other borrower firm characteristics, such as Current Ratio, Tangibility, and 
Interest Coverage, also vary across our sample.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
For the loan characteristics, the result reveals that the sample’s average loan highly 
dispersed from its mean value as the mean of  loan size $700M with a median value of $350m, 
minimum value of $5M  and maximum value of  $15,000M. Other loan characteristics including 
maturities, collateral, and relations vary considerably across the sample. The mean value of 
maturities is 53 months. The maximum and minimum values of maturities are 85 months and 3 
months respectively. The standard deviation of 14 shows little dispersion of maturities from its 
mean. The mean and median value of secured is 0.128 and 0, only 12.8% of the sample loans 
have collateral requirements. This result also indicates that most of the borrowers (69%) have 
prior relations with lenders. The mean of relation is 0.690 with a median value of 1, minimum 
value of 0 and maximum value of 1.  
Correlation is a way to measure whether and how two or more variables are related to 
each other. In this study, Pearson correlation coefficient is used to measure the correlation 
between variables. Table 11 provides the result of Pearson correlation analysis. As expected, the 
bank loan spreads are negatively correlated with Social Media postings at 5% level, and 
negatively correlated with XBRL adoption at 1% level. This result shows the preliminary 
evidence about the effect of XBRL and social media on bank loan spreads. Also, the highest 
variance inflation factor (VIF) in our regression is only 5.800, which is below the suggested 
multicollinearity problem threshold of 10(Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000) . This result 
indicates that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem in this study.  
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[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
4.2 XBRL ADOPTION AND BANK LOAN PRICE 
In this section, I use OLS regression analysis to examine the relationship between XBRL 
adoption and bank loan price, and the relationship between social media sentiment and bank loan 
price. The regression results are reported in table 12.The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of loan spread. In column 1, I use XBRL to measure the adoption of XBRL. Firm and 
loan characteristics such as Asset, Leverage, Current Ratio, Cash to Debt Ratio, Profitability, 
Interest Coverage, Tangibility, MB, zscore, Loan Size, Prior Relations are also included in the 
regression. Based on the discussion above, I control for industry effect, loan-type effect, and 
loan-purpose effect in the regressions.  
[Insert Table 12 here] 
I find that the coefficient of XBRL is -0.132 and is significant at the 1% level (t = -3.242), 
indicating that a 1% increase in XBRL adoption is related to about a 0. 132% decrease in bank 
loan spread. This result shows that the effect of XBRL adoption on the bank loan price is 
statistically significant. Other firm and loan characteristics including log(asset),  Profitability, 
MB, zscore are significantly negatively related to loan spread indicating that banks charge lower 
interest rates to borrowers with higher earnings quality, more growth opportunities, and lower 
loan risk. The coefficient of loan size is also negative and significant suggesting that the increase 
of loan size will reduce monitoring costs of bank loan. However, while Cash to Debt Ratio, 
Tangibility, and Prior Relations are negatively related to loan spread. These relations are not 
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significant. This result indicates that some firm and loan characteristics only have a weak effect 
on loan spread.  
In sum, the results of Table 12 are consistent with H1a that adoption of XBRL reduces 
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, which enables lenders to offer favorable 
loan price to borrowers. 
4.3 SOCIAL MEDIA SENTIMENT AND BANK LOAN PRICE 
In this study, I collect social media data from two websites: Yahoo Finance message 
board and Seeking Alpha. As discussed above, the postings and comments on social media sites 
represents users' opinions and views about specific firms. As the sentiment of online postings is 
an indicator to firm's risks and market performance, I predict that the sentiment of online 
postings is negatively associated with bank loan price. Column 2 and column 3 of table 12 report 
the regression results related to two social media sites. The coefficient of Yahoo sentiment is -
.047(t=-.701). The p value is .484, which is not significant. This result indicates that Yahoo user 
opinion only has a weak impact on bank loan price. Interestingly, I find that the coefficient of 
Seeking Alpha sentiment is -0.157, and is significant at the 5% level (t = -1.894). These results 
indicate that a 1% increase in Seeking Alpha sentiment is related to about a 0.157 % decrease in 
bank loan spread. Column 4 shows the how the interaction of XBRL adoption and social media 
sentiment affect bank price. As I expected, the coefficients of the interaction is -0.284 and is 
significant at the 5% level (t = -2.337). The result indicates that borrowers adopting XBRL and 
receiving positive postings are more likely to get favorable loan price. In sum, the results of 
Seeking Alpha data are consistent with H1b that social media sentiment is negatively associated 
with loan price. 
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According to the results in column2 and column3, predictive power between two social 
media sites is different. In order to identify the cause of this difference, I perform further analysis 
on the postings of these two sites. First, I conduct a pair t-test analysis to compare the postings 
means. Table 13 shows the result of the analysis. The result indicates that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the mean of Seeking Alpha sentiment and Yahoo sentiment. The 
mean of seekingscore - yahoo is 0.26 indicating the mean of Seeking Alpha sentiment is 0.26  
[Insert Table 13 here] 
greater than the mean of Yahoo sentiment. Second, I randomly select 100 postings of the same 
firm from both two websites. I find that the average word of Seeking Alpha is 34 while the 
average word of Yahoo posting is 15. Table 14 shows the sample of Yahoo postings and Seeking 
Alpha postings. By manually analyzing the content of these postings, I find that 23% of Yahoo 
postings are unrelated to particular firm's risks or values while only 8% of Seeking Alpha 
postings are unrelated to particular firm's risks or values. This result implies that focus and 
quality of postings also have an impact on the predictive power of social media sentiment.  
[Insert Table 14 here] 
4.4 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
4.4.1 CONTROLLING FOR FIRM CLUSTERING 
In prior regressions, I control for industry effect, which is based on Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) System. A potential disadvantage of SIC is that it is a static system, which 
cannot capture the evolvement of firm’s business and industry structure. As an additional 
robustness check, I use a dynamic classification approach defined in section 2.2.3 to control for 
industry effect. I first collect the 10-K annual financial statements of all listed firms from 2009 to 
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2011. As some firms have more than one XBRL based 10-K from 2009 to 2011, I only choose 
the earliest submission. A spectral clustering method is used to analyze the links between 
companies and XBRL tags. Finally, 20 clusters are identified from 1799 filings. I then control for 
cluster effect and re-estimate the regressions. Table 15 reports the regressions results. Similar to 
the results in table 12, the coefficient of XBRL adoption is -0.160 and is significant at the 1% 
level, the coefficient of Seeking Alpha sentiment is -0.231 and is significant at the 5% level, the 
coefficient of interaction between XBRL adoption and Seeking Alpha sentiment is -0.162 and is 
significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that SIC classification system did not influence 
the primary results. 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
 
4.4.2 EXCLUSION OF FINANCIAL AND UTILITY FIRMS 
Prior studies find that financial and utility firms are in regulated industries and may have 
different loan costs compared to other firms(Hasan et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2011). To remove the 
effect of these firms, I perform an analysis using a sample that excludes financial and utility 
firms. Table 16 reports the regressions results. The coefficient of XBRL adoption is -0.128 and is 
significant at the 1% level, the coefficient of Seeking Alpha sentiment is -0.087 and is significant 
at the 10% level, the coefficient of interaction between XBRL adoption and Seeking Alpha 
sentiment is -0.087 and is significant at the 5% level. As the coefficients are very similar to those 
in Table 12, I conclude that my results are not driven by financial and utility firms. 
[Insert Table 16 here] 
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4.4.3 MEDIAN REGRESSION   
Following Hasan et al. (2012)'s suggestion, I perform a median regression to investigate 
whether loans with extreme interest rates mislead the results. Table 17 shows the results of 
median regression. The coefficient of XBRL adoption is -0.108 and is significant at the 1% level, 
the coefficient of Seeking Alpha sentiment is -0.0009 and is significant at the 5% level, the 
coefficient of interaction between XBRL adoption and Seeking Alpha sentiment is -0.0007 and is 
significant at the 10% level. These results indicate that outlier is unlikely to be a problem in this 
study.  
[Insert Table 17 here] 
4.5 EFFECT OF FIRM SIZE 
In this section, I first test H2a to see whether XBRL adoption has a stronger effect on 
small-sized borrowers. I construct a dummy variable, Small firms, which equals one if a firm’s 
assets are less than the sample median of total assets, and zero otherwise. I add Small firms, the 
interaction of Small firms and XBRL adoption to the model and run the new regression. The 
results are in column 1 of table 18. The coefficient of the interaction term between XBRL 
adoption and Small firms is -0.052, p value is 0.421, which is not significant. The results suggest 
that XBRL adoption does not have a stronger effect on loan prices of small-sized firms. In this 
case, H2a is not supported.  
[Insert Table 18 here] 
Next, I test H2b to see whether the effect of social media sentiment on bank loan prices is 
stronger for small firms. I add Small firms, the interaction of Small firms and social media 
sentiment to the model and rerun the regression. Column2 of table 18 shows that the coefficient 
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of the interaction term between social media sentiment and Small firms is 0.370 and is 
significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that social media sentiment has a stronger effect 
on loan prices of small-sized firms. Hence, H2b is supported. 
4.6 EFFECT OF NEW RELATIONSHIP 
To verify H3a that XBRL adoption has a stronger impact on new-relationship lending, I 
construct a dummy variable, New Loans, which equals one if there is no previous lending 
relationship between lenders and borrowers, and zero otherwise. I add New Loans, the 
interaction of New Loans and XBRL adoption to the model and run the new regression. The 
results are in column 1 of table 19. The coefficient of the interaction term between XBRL 
adoption and New Loans is -0.05, p value is 0.385 that is not significant at the 10% level. The 
result suggests that the effect of XBRL adoption on bank loan prices is not stronger for loans in 
new relationships. In this case, H3a is not supported.  
[Insert Table 19 here] 
Next, I test H3b to see whether social media sentiment has a stronger impact on new-
relationship lending. I add New Loans, the interaction of New Loans and social media sentiment 
to the model and rerun the regression. Column2 of table 19 shows that the coefficient of the 
interaction term is 0.270, and p value is 0.145, which is not significant at the 10% level. Hence, 
H3b is not supported.   
4.7 EFFECT OF SYNDICATION 
In this section, I first test H4a to see whether XBRL adoption has a stronger impact on 
syndicated lending. I construct a dummy variable, Syndication, which equals one if a loan is 
offered by more than one lender, and zero otherwise. I add the Syndication, the interaction of 
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Syndication and XBRL adoption to the model and run the new regression. The results are in 
column 1 of table 20. The coefficient of the interaction term between XBRL adoption and 
Syndication is -0.577, p value is significant at the 1% level. The results suggest the effect of 
XBRL adoption on bank loan prices is stronger for syndicated loans than for sole-owner loans. In 
this case, H4a is supported.  
[Insert Table 20 here] 
Next, I test H4b to see whether social media sentiment has a stronger impact on 
syndicated lending. I add the Syndication, the interaction of Syndication and social media 
sentiment to the model and rerun the regression. Column2 of table 20 shows that the coefficient 
of the interaction term is 1.040, and p value is significant at the 10% level. The results suggest 
the effect of social media sentiment on bank loan prices is stronger for syndicated loans than for 
sole-owner loans Hence, H4b is supported.       
4.8 XBRL ADOPTION, SOCIAL MEDIA SENTIMENT, AND NON-PRICE LOAN TERMS  
Lenders use various non-price terms such as loan maturities and collateral to control loan 
risk and minimize information problems. The literature has confirmed that higher information 
asymmetry, greater uncertainty often result in shorter maturity, more requirements of collateral. 
As XBRL and social media can reduce information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers 
significantly, I hypothesize that borrowers that adopt XBRL and receive more positive postings 
on social media are more likely to enjoy favorable non-price terms. This hypothesis is tested in 
the following sections. 
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4.8.1 LOAN MATURITY 
In this section, I use a new regression model to test whether XBRL Adoption, Social 
media sentiment affect loan maturities. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
maturity. I use XBRL to measure the adoption of XBRL. Firm and loan characteristics such as 
asset, leverage, Current Ratio, Cash to Debt Ratio, Profitability, Interest Coverage, Tangibility, 
MB, zscore, loan size, Prior Relations are also included in the regression. I also control for 
industry effect, loan-type effect, and loan-purpose effect in the regression. The results are in 
column1 and column2 of table 21. The coefficient of XBRL adoption is -0.007, p value is 0.872, 
which is not significant at the 10% level. The result suggests the XBRL adoption is not related to 
loan maturities. In this case, H5a is not supported. For the social media sentiment, The 
coefficient is -0.029, p value is 0.718 that is also not significant at the 10% level. The result 
indicates the social media sentiment does not affect loan maturities. Hence, H5b is not supported. 
[Insert Table 21 here] 
 
4.8.2 COLLATERAL 
To test the effect of XBRL Adoption, Social media sentiment on collateral, I construct a 
dummy variable, Secured, which equals one if a loan is secured by collateral, and zero otherwise. 
Column 1 of table 22 shows the results. I find that the coefficient of XBRL adoption is -0.062 
and is significant at the 10% level (t = -1.635), indicating that borrowers adopting XBRL are less 
likely to be required to provide collateral. Hence, H6a is supported. 
[Insert Table 22 here] 
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Next, I test the relationship between Secured and social media sentiment. Column 2 of 
table 22 shows the results. I find that the coefficient of social media sentiment is -0.079, p value 
is 0.204, which is not significant at the 10% level. This result suggests that social media 
sentiment does not have significant effect on the use of collateral. Hence, H6b is not supported. 
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Many studies have demonstrated that XBRL and social media can facilitate the 
information sharing and minimize information asymmetry in the stock markets. However, few 
studies empirically test the relations between XRBL and bank loan contracting or relations 
between social media and bank loan contracting. This study aims to fill this gap by examining 
the influence of XBRL adoption and social media sentiment on bank loan contracting especially 
the cost of loan. In the following sections, I summarize the results of this study and offer 
recommendations for further research. 
5.1 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS  
The results of analyses support the idea that XBRL and social media can decrease data 
redundancy, increase information-processing capability, and facilitate information sharing in the 
capital markets. The main findings and implications of this study are listed as follows:  First, the 
analysis on XBRL adoption indicates that a 1% increase in XBRL adoption is related to about a 
0.132% decrease in bank loan spreads after controlling for certain firm characteristics and loan 
characteristics. This finding reveals that the XBRL can enhance accounting disclosures and 
mitigate the information asymmetry problem between borrowers and lenders.  
Second, the analysis on social media sentiment shows two different results. 1) While both 
Yahoo sentiment and Seeking Alpha sentiment are negatively associated with loan spread, the 
coefficient of Yahoo sentiment is insignificant, indicating that Yahoo user opinions only have a 
very weak influence on loan price. 2) The coefficient of Seeking Alpha sentiment is significant at 
the 5% level, suggesting that borrowers receive more positive postings on Seeking Alpha are 
more likely to enjoy favorable loan price. Further analysis on the postings of these two sites 
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shows that Yahoo postings are more "general" than Seeking Alpha postings. As most articles and 
comments on Seeking Alpha were published and reviewed by professionals, the information 
shared on this site has more influence on loan contracting. From this point, the focus and quality 
of postings may result in different predictive power between Yahoo and Seeking Alpha. Overall, 
the results of analyses confirm that social media facilitate information sharing and dissemination, 
and social media sentiment is an important indicator of firm's potential risks and values.  
Third, I find that XBRL adoption and social media user opinions have stronger effect on 
syndicated lending than for sole-owner lending. Hasan et al. (2012) suggest that the members of 
syndicated loans rely more on public information due to the risk of the syndicate moral hazard. 
As XBRL and social media facilitate information sharing and retrieving, lenders of syndicated 
loans are more likely to use these technologies to assess borrower's firm risk and default risk. 
Therefore, XBRL and social media play a more important role in the syndicated loans. 
Fourth, this study confirms the hypothesis that social media sentiment is more important 
for small-sized borrowers. Prior studies indicate that small-sized firms have less opportunity to 
get favorable loan terms due to high information asymmetry between lenders and them(Das et al., 
1998; Dennis & Sharpe, 2005). My findings suggest that social media can help mitigate 
information asymmetry between lenders and small-sized borrowers. In this case, small-sized 
firms can benefit more from social media in loan contracting.  
Finally, according to the view of borrower moral hazard models, lenders use collateral to 
compensate for potential losses caused by information risk and default risk. My study indicates 
that the adoption of XBRL can reduce the incidence of collateral. I interpret this finding as the 
evidence that XBRL has the potential to reduce lenders' reliance on traditional non-price loan 
terms because it can improve transparency and efficiency for loan contracting. 
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Besides the hypotheses confirmed by this study, some non-significant results also have 
implications for the literature. First, the analysis shows that XBRL adoption does not have a 
stronger effect on loan price for small-sized firms. One possible explanation of this result is that 
XBRL adoption affects loan contracting in multiple ways. While XBRL makes it easier for 
lenders to evaluate the risk of small firms, large companies also benefit a lot from XBRL 
adoption. For instance,  Roohani (2003) suggest that advantage of adopting XBRL is greater for 
large companies because XBRL facilitates the integration of business reporting procedures. At 
this point, XBRL can provide significant benefits to both small and large firms. Second, this 
study suggests that the substitution effects of XBRL and social media are not as strong as I 
expected. In H3a and H3b, I predict that the adoption of XBRL and social media sentiment are 
more important for new-relationship lending. However, these hypotheses are not supported by 
the analyses. This result implies that when lenders have limited access to the private information 
of borrowers, they may rely on other traditional tools such as business press or professional 
databases to evaluate loan risks. In this case, the adoption of XBRL and social media sentiment 
only has a weak influence on new-relationship lending. This finding may also explain the non-
results for the hypotheses concerning the effects of XBRL adoption and social media sentiment 
on loan maturities (H5a, H5b) and collateral (H6b). 
5.2 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This study is limited in several ways. First, this study uses two social media websites to 
analyze the influence of social media sentiment on loan contracts. Some popular websites such 
as Google Finance and Facebook are not included in the dataset. In addition, the social media 
dataset used in the experiments is from the postings of two websites in 2011. This dataset may 
not be able to fully reveal the influence of social media on today's financial markets. As more 
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stakeholders rely on various social media to express their opinions and findings, future research 
should explore more social media websites and employ more current data to improve the quality 
of the results. 
Second, the models in this study only contain limited control variables. For instance, the 
access to public debt markets is suggested to have an influence on loan contracting because this 
access increase borrowers' bargaining power with banks(Hasan et al., 2012). Similarly, Accruals 
is also found to be associated with bank loan prices. Due to limited data access, these variables 
are not included in the models. In the future, I will include more variables in the models and 
investigate how these variables affect the relations between XBRL adoption and loan contracting, 
and relations between social media user opinions and loan contracting. 
Third, prior studies find that the quality of sentiment analysis depends on how the 
sentiment analysis algorithms specialize to the particular domain(Hogenboom, Bal, Frasincar, & 
Bal, 2013; Nann et al., 2013). This study uses a predefined domain dictionary to determine 
financial sentiment in the postings. In the future, more valuable predefined words should be 
added to the domain dictionary to increase the accuracy of sentiment analysis. In addition, this 
study only applies single sentiment analysis method, which cannot efficiently extract sentiment 
from various social media data sources. For instance, the length of posts on Twitter is relatively 
short. As short tweets do not provide enough word occurrence, it is unsuitable to apply sentiment 
analysis method used in this study to identify and categorize sentiment in tweets. In this case, a 
method using  the  author  information  and  features within  the  tweets may achieve higher 
quality in sentiment recognition(Sriram, Fuhry, Demir, Ferhatosmanoglu, & Demirbas, 2010). 
To address this issue, future research should apply a variety of sophisticated sentiment analysis 
methods to improve the performance of sentiment analysis. 
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5.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
There are many possibilities exist for future research. First, future work could extend the 
research to private firms. Prior studies find that there is less information asymmetry in private 
firms than in public firms because major investors can easily access internal information of 
private firms(Chen, Hope, Li, & Wang, 2011; Kim & Kwon, 2015).  While major investors often 
manage private firms directly, lenders in the capital markets may not have the same access as 
major investors have. Hence, it is necessary to investigate how XBRL and social media affect the 
information asymmetry between private borrowers and lenders.  
Second, future research could explore the impact of XBRL and social media on loan 
contracts in markets of other countries. Compared to US market, other markets have different 
culture and social structures that may result in various levels of information asymmetry. Further 
investigation on other markets would help practitioners to have a better understanding of how to 
use XBRL and social media to minimize information risk under different circumstances.  
Finally, analytic tools used in this study can only extract attitude, and feelings from social 
media websites. A lot of useful information including concepts, keywords, relations, and social 
structures is excluded. Therefore, future research could apply more analytic approaches such as 
content analysis or social network analysis to further explore the effects of social media on 
capital markets. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether two information technology 
advancements, the adoption of XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language), and social 
media, affect bank loan contracting. Using a sample of 554 US bank loan contracts in 2011, I 
find that borrowers that adopt XBRL and/or receive more positive social media user opinion 
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enjoy more favorable price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. Additional analyses 
indicate that the relations between XBRL adoption and bank loan price, and relations between 
social media user opinion and bank loan price vary with the firm size, loan structure, and 
availability of public information of borrowers. Overall, this study provides empirical evidence 
that technology advancements, the adoption of XRBL and social media, reduce cost of bank 
loans by decreasing information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. 
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Figure 1 Firm Clustering System 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Clustering Firms Based on the Tags Firms Used 
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Figure 3 Distribution of Major Industry in 20 Clusters 
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Figure 5 User Interface of Hive Based Distributed Storage Platform 
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Figure 6 Message Board of Microsoft on Yahoo Finance 
(Yahoo Finance, 2016) 
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Figure 7 Sample Articles and Comments of Microsoft on Seeking Alpha 
(Seeking Alpha, 2016b) 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
Table 1 Example of XBRL Specification 
Name Definition Examples 
Simple link 
A link that points from 
one resource to another. 
It points to Linkbases 
from XBRL Instances 
and from Taxonomy 
Schemas or points to 
Taxonomy Schemas 
from XBRL Instance 
<complexContent> 
  <restriction base="anyType"> 
      <attributeGroup ref="xlink:simpleType"/> 
      <attribute ref="xlink:href" use="required"/> 
      <attribute ref="xlink:arcrole" 
use="optional"/> 
      <attribute ref="xlink:role" use="optional"/> 
      <anyAttribute 
namespace="http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/na
mespace" processContents="lax"/> 
   </restriction> 
</complexContent> 
The 
"schemaRef" 
element in 
XBRL 
Instances 
Every XBRL instance 
must contain at least 
one "schemaRef" 
element. It points to a 
Taxonomy Schema that 
becomes part of the 
DTS supporting that 
XBRL instance. 
<element name="schemaRef" 
type="xl:simpleType" 
substitutionGroup="xl:simple"> 
  <annotation> 
    <documentation> 
Definition of the schemaRef element - used to 
link to XBRL taxonomy schemas from XBRL 
instances.  
    </documentation> 
  </annotation> 
</element> 
Notes: Retrieved  from http://www.xbrl.org/Specification/XBRL-2.1/REC-2003-12-31/XBRL-2.1-REC-
2003-12-31+corrected-errata-2013-02-20.html#_3.5.1 
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Table 2 Example of Taxonomy Schemas 
Name Data Type Definition 
Interest 
Receivable 
monetary 
<xs:element id="us-gaap_InterestReceivable" 
name="InterestReceivable" nillable="true" 
substitutionGroup="xbrli:item" 
type="xbrli:monetaryItemType" xbrli:balance="debit" 
xbrli:periodType="instant"/> 
InterestBearing 
ForeignDeposit 
MoneyMarket 
monetary 
<xs:element id="us-
gaap_InterestBearingForeignDepositMoneyMarket" 
name="InterestBearingForeignDepositMoneyMarket" 
nillable="true" substitutionGroup="xbrli:item" 
type="xbrli:monetaryItemType" xbrli:balance="credit" 
xbrli:periodType="instant"/> 
InterestBearing 
DepositLiabilities 
ByComponent 
Abstract 
string 
<xs:element abstract="true" id="us-
gaap_InterestBearingDepositLiabilitiesByComponentAbs
tract" 
name="InterestBearingDepositLiabilitiesByComponentA
bstract" nillable="true" substitutionGroup="xbrli:item" 
type="xbrli:stringItemType" 
xbrli:periodType="duration"/> 
Investment 
OwnedValued 
ByTrusteesFlag 
boolean 
<xs:element id="us-
gaap_InvestmentOwnedValuedByTrusteesFlag1" 
name="InvestmentOwnedValuedByTrusteesFlag1" 
nillable="true" substitutionGroup="xbrli:item" 
type="xbrli:booleanItemType" 
xbrli:periodType="duration"/> 
Notes: Retrieved from http://xbrl.fasb.org/us-gaap/2016/elts/us-gaap-2016-01-31.xsd 
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Table 3 Example of Taxonomy Linkbases 
Element 
Linked 
Elements 
Weight Definition 
IncomeTaxesPaid
Refund 
IncomeTaxes
PaidRefundC
lassifiedAsIn
vestingActivi
ties 
1 
     <link:calculationArc xlink:type="arc" 
xlink:arcrole="http://www.xbrl.org/2003/arc
role/summation-item" 
xlink:from="IncomeTaxesPaidRefund" 
xlink:to="IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifie
dAsInvestingActivities" 
xlink:title="calculation: 
IncomeTaxesPaidRefund to 
IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifiedAsInvest
ingActivities" order="1.0" weight="1.0"/> 
IncomeTaxesPaid
Refund 
IncomeTaxes
PaidRefundC
lassifiedAsO
peratingActiv
ities 
1 
     <link:calculationArc xlink:type="arc" 
xlink:arcrole="http://www.xbrl.org/2003/arc
role/summation-item" 
xlink:from="IncomeTaxesPaidRefund" 
xlink:to="IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifie
dAsOperatingActivities" 
xlink:title="calculation: 
IncomeTaxesPaidRefund to 
IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifiedAsOpera
tingActivities" order="2.0" weight="1.0"/> 
 
Notes: Retrieved from http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/76/76540/xbrl/2013//trito-
20131231_cal.xml 
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Table 4 Example of XBRL Instance Documents 
Element Context Value Definition 
CashFlowsBefore
ChangesWorking
Capital 
Current_ 
ForPeriod 
57400 
<iascf-
pfs:CashFlowsBeforeChangesWorkingCa
pital 
numericContext="Current_ForPeriod"> 
574000 
</iascf-
pfs:CashFlowsBeforeChangesWorkingCa
pital> 
 
CashFlowsBefore
ChangesWorking
Capital 
Prior_ 
ForPeriod 
442000 
<iascf-
pfs:CashFlowsBeforeChangesWorkingCa
pital numericContext="Prior_ForPeriod"> 
442000 
</iascf-
pfs:CashFlowsBeforeChangesWorkingCa
pital> 
 
Notes: Retrieved from http://www.xbrl.org/taxonomy/int/fr/ias/ci/pfs/2002-11-15/SampleCompany-
2002-11-15.xml 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Example of Firm-Tag Matrix 
 Firm1 Firm2 ... Firmn  
Tag1 0  1  …  1 
Tag2 1  1  …  1 
... …  …  …  …  
Tagn 1 0 …  1 
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Table 6 Evaluation of the Number of Clusters 
Cluster number Local density Relative density Total density 
2 0.0171 0.7596 0.0116 
3 0.0409 0.6735 0.0237 
4 0.0309 0.5052 0.0179 
5 0.0278 0.4755 0.0158 
6 0.0279 0.4289 0.0150 
7 0.0301 0.3806 0.0136 
8 0.0344 0.3550 0.0152 
9 0.0444 0.3696 0.0208 
10 0.0495 0.3587 0.0215 
11 0.0500 0.3417 0.0214 
12 0.0510 0.3214 0.0209 
13 0.0491 0.3052 0.0193 
14 0.0670 0.3009 0.0258 
15 0.0648 0.2870 0.0245 
16 0.0666 0.2907 0.0250 
17 0.0737 0.2899 0.0260 
18 0.0730 0.2786 0.0251 
19 0.0754 0.2586 0.0237 
20 0.1002 0.2540 0.0306 
21 0.0909 0.2470 0.0293 
22 0.0983 0.2325 0.0289 
23 0.0939 0.2215 0.0269 
24 0.0894 0.2117 0.0255 
25 0.0911 0.2097 0.0258 
26 0.0904 0.2002 0.0246 
27 0.0872 0.1908 0.0228 
28 0.0901 0.1889 0.0228 
29 0.1186 0.1834 0.0257 
30 0.1186 0.1846 0.0263 
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Table 7 Firm Distribution among Industry Groups According to NAICS 
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Table 8 Frequent Elements in Cluster 1, Cluster 2, Cluster 5, and Cluster 6 
  
Cluster Frequently Used Elements 
1 AccumulatedDeferredInvestmentTaxCredit,PublicUtilitiesDisclosureTextBlock,RegulatoryAssetsCurrent 
RegulatoryLiabilityCurrent, RegulatoryLiabilities, AdditionalCollateralAggregateFairValue, 
RegulatoryAssets , ScheduleOfJointlyOwnedUtilityPlantsTextBlock, 
JointlyOwnedUtilityPlantProportionateOwnershipShare, 
JointlyOwnedUtilityPlantOwnershipAmountOfPlantAccumulatedDepreciation. 
DebtInstrumentUnamortizedDiscountPremiumNet, PublicUtilitiesPolicyTextBlock 
2 PartnersCapital, GeneralPartnersCapitalAccount, LimitedPartnersCapitalAccount, 
PartnersCapitalAccountDistributions, LimitedPartnersCapitalAccountUnitsOutstanding 
NetIncomeLossAllocatedToLimitedPartners , PartnersCapitalNotesDisclosureTextBlock, 
LiabilitiesAndPartnersCapital, NetIncomeLossPerOutstandingLimitedPartnershipUnit 
NetIncomeLossAllocatedToGeneralPartners , WeightedAverageLimitedPartnershipUnitsOutstanding 
5 IncreaseDecreaseInUnearnedPremiums, IncreaseDecreaseInPremiumsReceivable,  
PrepaidReinsurancePremiums, ReinsurancePayable 
IncreaseDecreaseInDeferredPolicyAcquisitionCosts, NetInvestmentIncome 
SupplementalScheduleOfReinsurancePremiumsForInsuranceCompaniesTextBlock， 
SupplementaryInsuranceInformationForInsuranceCompaniesDisclosureTextBlock，  
IncreaseDecreaseInReinsuranceRecoverable , PremiumsReceivableAtCarryingValue 
6 ScheduleOfProductWarrantyLiabilityTableTextBlock , FutureAmortizationExpenseAfterYearFive 
ScheduleOfAccruedLiabilitiesTableTextBlock, ScheduleOfDebtTableTextBlock 
BusinessAcquisitionsProFormaRevenue, LiabilitiesFairValueDisclosure 
BusinessAcquisitionsProFormaNetIncomeLoss,  
ShareBasedCompensationArrangementByShareBasedPayme. 
ShareBasedCompensationArrangementByShareBasedPayme, StandardProductWarrantyPolicy 
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Table 9 Results of Sample Selection 
Stages # of Firms # of loans 
Number of transactions in the Thompson one 
database 
3835 5905 
Exclude private and non-US companies (3277) (5149) 
Exclude records without available LIBOR price (55) (80) 
Exclude borrowers without submission of 10-k 
from 2009 to 2011 
(45) (88) 
Exclude borrowers without posts on Yahoo 
message board and Seeking Alpha 
(32) (34) 
Total number of samples 426 554 
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Table 10 Summary Statistics 
Variable 
Min Median Mean Max Std. Dev. 
Loan Spread 5 175 199.621 1,150 123.194 
XBRL 0 1 0.894 2 0.759 
Social 
Media(Seeking 
Alpha) 
-0.706 0.221 0.217 1.200 0.334 
Social 
Media(Yahoo) 
-1.161 -0.002 0.026 1.350 0.307 
Log(Asset) 7.500 9.439 9.458 11.860 0.720 
Leverage 0 0.260 0.280 1.450 0.202 
Current Ratio 0.250 1.600 1.915 8.770 1.141 
Cash to Debt 
Ratio 
0 0.221 88.471 42,040.67 1.853 
Profitability -0.260 0.121 0.132 0.682 0.083 
Interest 
Coverage 
-23.281 5.174 31.839 1554.330 123.508 
Tangibility 0 0.190 0.289 0.940 0.266 
M/B 0.790 1.400 1.705 8.090 0.968 
zscore -10.600 1.779 1.774 6.274 1.436 
Loan Characteristics 
Loan Size(M) 5 350 700.323 15,000 1,155 
Maturity 3 60.120 53.262 84.720 14.601 
Secured 0 0 0.128 1 0.335 
Prior Relations 0 1 0.685 1 0.465 
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Table 12 XBRL Adoption, Social Media Sentiment, and Bank Loan Price 
Dependent variable: Log(spread) Log(spread) Log(spread) Log(spread) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
XBRL  -.132*** 
(-3.242) 
  -.125* 
(-1.806) 
Social Media 
(Yahoo) 
 -.047 
(-.701) 
  
Social Media 
(Seeking alpha) 
  -.157** 
(-1.894) 
.204 
(1.224) 
XBRL*Social 
Media(Seeking 
alpha) 
   -.284** 
(-2.337) 
Log(asset)   -.185*** 
(-3.416) 
-.315*** 
(-7.284) 
-.412*** 
(-6.997) 
-.251*** 
(-2.794) 
Leverage    .407*** 
(3.609) 
.556*** 
(4.464) 
.573*** 
(3.149) 
.525*** 
(2.934) 
Current Ratio .030* 
(1.670) 
.019 
(.929) 
.007 
(.213) 
.010 
(.335) 
Cash to Debt Ratio  -.00001 
(-.769) 
-.00003*** 
(-2.725) 
-.00001 
(-.743) 
-.00001 
(-1.275) 
Profitability    -1.270*** 
(-3.460) 
-1.654*** 
(-3.633) 
-1.472** 
(-2.570) 
-1.470*** 
(-2.571) 
Interest Coverage .0003 
(1.494) 
.002*** 
(3.777) 
.0003* 
(1.582) 
.0003* 
(1.553) 
Tangibility             -.104 
(-1.193) 
.046 
(.447) 
-.218 
(-1.490) 
-.269* 
(-1.867) 
MB    -.088*** 
(-3.301) 
-.120*** 
(-3.785) 
-.139*** 
(-3.310) 
-.135*** 
(-3.280) 
zscore    -.068*** 
(-3.869) 
-.055*** 
(-2.903) 
-.051** 
(-2.089) 
-.052** 
(-2.180) 
Loan Size     .0001*** 
(-5.220) 
.0001*** 
(-4.755) 
-.0001*** 
(-3.606) 
.0001*** 
(-4.211) 
Prior Relations             -.045 
(-1.089) 
-.061 
(-1.313) 
-.047 
(-.638) 
-.041 
(-.572) 
Control For   
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Table 12  (Continued) 
     
Industry Effect Y Y Y Y 
Loan-Type effect 
 
Y Y Y Y 
Loan-Purpose Effect Y Y Y Y 
Observations 411 321 211 211 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.632 0.618 0.667 0.684 
 
    Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively. 
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Table 13 Paired Sample Test 
 Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
Seeking 
Alpha - 
Yahoo 
0.260 0.461 
 
8.082 
 
205 .000 
 
 
 
Table 14 Examples of Yahoo Postings and Seeking Alpha Postings 
 
Yahoo  postings Seeking Alpha  postings 
Me 4! Mikey D's is the 
best performing stock in 
my portfolio. 
Thanks for the analysis on MCD, DGI. This is one of my 
favorite companies. Wonderful product, excellent recognition, 
and who really thinks McDonald's won't be around in 50 years? 
100 years? I keep wanting to pick more MCD up on dips, but it 
just seems to dip much less than others on my watchlist, so it is 
still a very small position for me. I hope to change that on the 
next dip. 
Dont fight the trend. The 
trend is your friend. 
As always, first class article. I am long MCD. Bought my first 
100 shares back in 1988. I wish I would have kept those, but I 
was a "trader" back in the day. There is no telling what my 
yield on cost for those shares would be today. (I KNOW there 
is, I'm just to lazy to look it up and I don't want to have to kick 
the crap out of myself 
HOMEMADE 
HAMBURGER RISING 
NOW! 
If you bought MCD, you must know something! Thanks for the 
heads up on the dividend increase. I'm sure my granddaughter 
will have it by then and maybe I will too 
summertime is for beer 
not coffee. 
I consider MCD to be more of a growth stock than a dividend 
stock. It has taken me a long time to compromise my yield on 
this stock down to 3%, but I never could get in. The same thing 
happened when I started investing in PG many years ago. 
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Table 15 Robustness Check- Control for Clusters 
Dependent 
Variable 
Log(spread) Log(spread) Log(spread) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
XBRL -.160*** 
(-2.871) 
 -.032* 
(-1.233) 
Social Media  -.231** 
(-2.452) 
.022 
(.856) 
XBRL*Social 
Media 
  -.162*** 
(-2.573) 
Log(asset) -.135* 
(-1.795) 
-.359*** 
(-3.851) 
-.229*** 
(-2.213) 
Leverage .452*** 
(2.791) 
.634*** 
(2.862) 
.854*** 
(1.032) 
Current Ratio .032 
(1.306) 
-.008 
(-.209) 
-.001 
(-.01) 
Cash to Debt 
Ratio 
-.0001 
(-.156) 
.018** 
(2.449) 
.008*** 
(1.522) 
Profitability -.704 
(-1.301) 
-1.678** 
(-2.381) 
-1.349** 
(-1.522) 
Interest Coverage .0001 
(.970) 
.001 
(.907) 
.0001 
(.325) 
Tangibility -.108 
(-.980) 
.004 
(.022) 
-.024 
(-1.153) 
MB -.165*** 
(-4.201) 
-.148*** 
(-2.994) 
-.102*** 
(-.1.832) 
zscore -.071*** 
(-3.656) 
-.042* 
(-1.629) 
-.023* 
(-1.325) 
Loan Size -.0001*** 
(-5.485) 
-.0001*** 
(-4.193) 
-.0001*** 
(-3.514) 
Prior Relations -.093* 
(-1.591) 
-.009 
(-.1) 
-.018 
(-.216) 
Control For     
Cluster Effect Y Y Y 
Industry Effect N N N 
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Table 15  (Continued) 
    
Loan-Type effect 
 
Y Y Y 
Loan-Purpose 
Effect 
Y Y Y 
Observations 259 163 163 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.567 0.609 0.652 
 
    Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively. 
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Table 16 Robustness Check- Exclude Financial and Utility Firms 
Dependent Variable Log(spread) Log(spread) Log(spread) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
XBRL -0.128*** 
(-3.069) 
 -.083* 
(-1.203) 
Social Media  -.087* 
(-.955) 
.102 
(2.230) 
XBRL*Social Media   -.087** 
(-1.321) 
Log(asset) -.153*** 
(-2.739) 
-.413*** 
(-6.662) 
-.189*** 
(-3.822) 
Leverage .381*** 
(3.359) 
.526*** 
(2.842) 
.228** 
(1.351) 
Current Ratio .019 
(1.030) 
.00001 
(.0004) 
.0002 
(.011) 
Cash to Debt Ratio -.00001 
(-.797) 
-.00001 
(-.837) 
-.00001 
(-.765) 
Profitability -1.636*** 
(-4.350) 
-1.973*** 
(-3.292) 
-1.601*** 
(-3.112) 
Interest Coverage -.0003* 
(1.828) 
-.0001* 
(1.805) 
.0002* 
(1.236) 
Tangibility -.037 
(-.412) 
-.049 
(-.302) 
.004 
(.032) 
MB -.067** 
(-2.432) 
-.110** 
(-2.501) 
-.057** 
(-1.869) 
zscore -.078*** 
(-4.371) 
-.058** 
(-2.365) 
-.071*** 
(-3.456) 
Loan Size -.0001*** 
(-6.043) 
-.0001*** 
(-4.156) 
.0001*** 
(-4.632) 
Prior Relations -.028 
(-.661) 
.021 
(.281) 
-.028 
(-.393) 
Control For     
Industry Effect Y Y Y 
Loan-Type effect 
 
Y Y Y 
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Table 16  (Continued) 
    
Loan-Purpose Effect Y Y Y 
Observations 370 187 187 
Adjusted R-Squared .657 .698 .715 
 
    Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively. 
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Table 17 Robustness Check- Median Regression 
Dependent Variable Log(spread) Log(spread) Log(spread) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
XBRL    -.108***   
(-2.696) 
 -.098** 
(-1.854) 
Social Media       -.001** 
(-2.439) 
0.032 
(1.223) 
XBRL*Social Media   -.0004* 
(-1.559)      
Prior Relations   -.034*  
(-.761 ) 
-.06 
(-1.364) 
 -.053*  
(-1.228)   
Log(asset)        -.285***  
(-6.237)   
     .281***  
(5.641)    
  -.283*** 
(-8.320)    
Leverage  .001 
(.348)    
   .002* 
(1.487)    
  .001 
(.235)     
Current Ratio   .001* 
(1.507)             
    .001* 
(1.891)   
  .001 
(2.002)     
Cash to Debt Ratio  -.0003  
(-1.308)  
    -.0001 
(-.317)  
  -.0001  
(-.282)  
Profitability   .0004   
(.665)  
     .0003 
(.568)   
    .0001  
(0.352)  
Interest Coverage   -.0003*  
(-1.412) 
     -.001** 
(-2.503) 
   -0.0001* 
(-.885)  
Tangibility  -.002*  
(-2.031)  
 -.0004 
(-0.373) 
   -.001 
(-.562)   
MB      -.003***   
(-5.204) 
   -.003*** 
(-5.321)   
 -0.002*** 
(-4.385)    
zscore      -.001***   
(-3.827) 
   -.001*** 
(-3.537)   
    -.001*** 
(-4.215)  
Loan Size   -.0004  
(-.767) 
    -.001*** 
(-.409)   
   -.001* 
(-1.125)   
Control For     
Industry Effect Y Y Y 
Loan-Type effect 
 
Y Y Y 
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Table 17  (Continued) 
    
Loan-Purpose Effect Y Y Y 
Observations 259 183 183 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.602 0.592 0.657 
 
    Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively. 
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Table 18 Firm Size, XBRL Adoption, Social Media Sentiment, and Loan Price 
Dependent Variable Log(spread) Log(spread) 
 (1) (2) 
XBRL -.164*** 
(-3.797) 
 
XBRL*Small Firms  -.052 
(-.806) 
 
Social Media  -.312*** 
(-2.879) 
Social Media*Small Firms  .370** 
(2.165) 
Small Firms .170** 
(2.350) 
.362*** 
(4.627) 
Leverage .399*** 
(3.489) 
.582*** 
(3.130) 
Current Ratio .033** 
(1.818) 
.010 
(.3) 
Cash to Debt Ratio -.00001 
(-.763) 
-.00001 
(-.567) 
Profitability -1.180*** 
(-3.210) 
-1.785*** 
(-3.051) 
Interest Coverage .0003 
(1.465) 
.0003 
(1.419) 
Tangibility -.104 
(-1.181) 
-.128 
(-.853) 
MB -.082*** 
(-3.033) 
-.110*** 
(-2.602) 
zscore -.065*** 
(-3.627) 
-.035 
(-1.416) 
Loan Size -.0001*** 
(-7.595) 
-.00015*** 
(-7.680) 
Prior Relations -.044 
(-1.041) 
-.055 
(-.718) 
Control For    
Industry Effect Y Y 
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Table 18  (Continued) 
   
Loan-Type effect 
 
Y Y 
Loan-Purpose Effect Y Y 
Observations 411 211 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.627 0.656 
 
    Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively. 
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Table 19 New Relationship, XBRL Adoption, Social Media Sentiment, and Loan Price 
Dependent Variable Log(spread) Log(spread) 
 (1) (2) 
XBRL -.118*** 
(-2.737) 
 
XBRL* New Loans -.050 
(-.869) 
 
Social Media  -.243*** 
(-2.400) 
Social Media* New Loans  .270 
(1.464) 
New Loans .080 
(1.386) 
-.011 
(-.127) 
Log(asset) -.183*** 
(-3.379) 
-.411*** 
(-6.997) 
Leverage .410*** 
(3.631) 
.552*** 
(3.036) 
Current Ratio .030* 
(1.705) 
.008 
(.268) 
Cash to Debt Ratio -.00001 
(-.832) 
-.00001 
(-.886) 
Profitability -1.260*** 
(-3.429) 
-1.644*** 
(-2.821) 
Interest Coverage .0003 
(1.479) 
.0003 
(1.495) 
Tangibility -.105 
(-1.205) 
-.213 
(-1.455) 
MB -.089*** 
(-3.319) 
-.133*** 
(-3.139) 
zscore -.069*** 
(-3.907) 
-.052** 
(-2.122) 
Loan Size -.0001*** 
(-5.284) 
-.0001*** 
(-3.605) 
Control For    
Industry Effect Y Y 
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Table 19  (Continued) 
   
Loan-Type effect 
 
Y Y 
Loan-Purpose Effect Y Y 
Observations 411 211 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.632 0.669 
 
    Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
 
 
Table 20 Syndication, XBRL Adoption, Social Media Sentiment, and Bank Loan Price 
Dependent Variable Log(spread) Log(spread) 
 (1) (2) 
XBRL -.577*** 
(-3.219) 
 
XBRL*Syndication .444** 
(2.529) 
 
Social Media  -1.178** 
(-1.978) 
Social Media* Syndication  1.040* 
(1.737) 
Syndication .532*** 
(2.865) 
.185 
(1.043) 
Log(asset) -.164*** 
(-3.029) 
-.388*** 
(-6.446) 
Leverage .427*** 
(3.772) 
.643*** 
(3.341) 
Current Ratio .033** 
(1.843) 
.010 
(.325) 
Cash to Debt Ratio -.00001 
(-.745) 
-.00001 
(-.706) 
Profitability -1.172*** 
(-3.199) 
-1.336** 
(-2.316) 
Interest Coverage .0003 
(1.522) 
.0004* 
(1.640) 
Tangibility -.102 
(-1.180) 
-.219 
(-1.498) 
MB -.089*** 
(-3.355) 
-.141*** 
(-3.354) 
zscore -.067*** 
(-3.841) 
-.049** 
(-2.029) 
Loan Size -.0001*** 
(-5.548) 
-.0001*** 
(-3.785) 
Prior Relations -.037 
(-.877) 
-.048 
(-.638) 
Control For    
105 
 
 
 
Table 20  (Continued) 
   
Industry Effect Y Y 
Loan-Type effect 
 
Y Y 
Loan-Purpose Effect Y Y 
Observations 411 211 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.638 0.670 
 
    Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively. 
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       Table 21 Loan Maturities, XBRL Adoption and Social Media Sentiment 
Dependent Variable Log(Maturity) Log(Maturity) 
 (1) (2) 
XBRL -.007 
(-.161) 
 
Social Media  -.029 
(-.362) 
Log(asset) .074 
(1.336) 
.011 
(.186) 
Leverage .077 
(.668) 
.162 
(.910) 
Current Ratio .037** 
(2.048) 
.053* 
(1.725) 
Cash to Debt Ratio .000004 
(.547) 
.000002 
(.276) 
Profitability .001 
(002) 
.304 
(.543) 
Interest Coverage -.0001 
(-.602) 
-.0001 
(-.474) 
Tangibility .063 
(.710) 
.001 
(.009) 
MB .013 
(.475) 
-.027 
(-.654) 
zscore .049*** 
(2.739) 
.025 
(1.051) 
Loan Size .00001 
(.409) 
.00002 
(.896) 
Prior Relations -.037 
(-.872) 
-.030 
(-.417) 
Control For    
Industry Effect Y Y 
Loan-Type effect 
 
Y Y 
Loan-Purpose Effect Y Y 
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Table 21  (Continued) 
   
Observations 411 211 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.348 0.449 
 
    Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively. 
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            Table 22 Collateral, XBRL Adoption, and Social Media Sentiment 
Dependent Variable Secured Secured 
 (1) (2) 
XBRL -.062* 
(-1.635) 
 
Social Media  -.079 
(-1.275) 
Log(asset) -.075 
(-1.484) 
-.131*** 
(-2.976) 
Leverage .261** 
(2.462) 
.176 
(1.298) 
Current Ratio .030* 
(1.775) 
-.009 
(-.372) 
Cash to Debt Ratio -.00001* 
(-1.719) 
-.00001 
(-1.433) 
Profitability -1.410*** 
(-4.092) 
-.753* 
(-1.765) 
Interest Coverage .001*** 
(2.693) 
.001*** 
(2.995) 
Tangibility .008 
(.104) 
-.107 
(-.975) 
MB .036 
(1.415) 
-.010 
(-.306) 
zscore .033** 
(2.015) 
.025 
(1.382) 
Loan Size .00002 
(1.198) 
.00002 
(1.323) 
Prior Relations -.084** 
(-2.146) 
-.129** 
(-2.348) 
Control For    
Industry Effect Y Y 
Loan-Type effect 
 
Y Y 
Loan-Purpose Effect Y Y 
Observations 411 211 
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Table 22  (Continued) 
   
Adjusted R-Squared 0.128 0.136 
 
    Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: DEFINITION OF STUDY VARIABLES 
Variables Definitions 
Log(spread) 
The natural logarithm of spread, where spread is the initial interest rate 
spread over London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
XBRL 
Times of borrowers included XBRL in its financial reporting from 
2009 to 2011 
Social Media 
Sum of financial terms sentiment and general sentiment, where 
Financial terms sentiment is the finance-related sentiment score of 
postings, general sentiment is the general sentiment score of postings. 
Log(Asset) The natural logarithm of the total assets of borrowers 
Leverage 
Total debts including long-term debt and short term debt divided by 
firm book assets 
Current Ratio Current assets divided by current liability 
Cash to Debt Ratio Total cash divided by total debt 
Profitability Net income over total sales 
Interest Coverage EBIT divided by total interest expense 
Tangibility Net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets 
MB Market to book ratio 
Loan Size Total amount of bank loan 
Prior Relations 
Dummy variable which is equal to one when there is a previous lending 
relationship between lenders and borrowers, it equals zero otherwise 
zscore 
(1.2*Working capital+1.48Retained earnings + 3.3*EBIT + 
0.999*Sales)/Total assets 
Maturity Loan maturity 
Secured 
Dummy variable, which equals one if a firm’s assets are less than the 
sample median of total assets, and zero otherwise 
New Loans 
Dummy variable, which equals one if when there is no a previous 
lending relationship between lenders and borrowers, and zero 
otherwise 
Syndication 
Dummy variable, which equals one if a loan is offered by more than 
one lender, and zero otherwise 
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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 
Variables Definitions 
Small Firms 
Dummy variable, which equals one if a firm’s assets are less than the 
sample median of total assets, and zero otherwise 
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